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WHATEVER HAPPENED TO THE RIGHT TO
TREATMENT?: THE MODERN QUEST FOR
A HISTORICAL PROMISE
Paul Holland*
& Wallace J. Mlyniec**
Since the creation of the first juvenile court in 1899,1 state training
schools have been the primary place of confinement for children removed
from their homes. 2 Although the rhetoric of the Progressive Reformers created an impression that children placed out of their homes by juvenile court
judges would reside in pleasant cottages staffed with benevolent substitute
parents, most children lived in large impersonal institutions. The cause of
their removal from their homes was irrelevant. Delinquent children, status
offenders, and neglected children were placed together with a promise of
care and rehabilitation. 3 Notwithstanding their idyllic-sounding names 4 and
their laudatory purposes, the institutions have historically been understaffed,
unhealthy, and devoid of rehabilitative programming. Many were, and some
continue to be, extremely dangerous places for children. By the time the
"children's rights revolution" began in the 1960s, it was clear to any observer
that the promise of the juvenile court had never been fulfilled. Indeed, the
United States Supreme Court stated in 1966 that "[t]here is evidence.., that
the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he gets neither the protec* Visiting Professor of Law & Deputy Director of the Juvenile Justice Clinic, Georgetown
University Law Center.
** Professor of Law, Associate Dean, and Director of the Juvenile Justice Clinic, Georgetown University Law Center.
The authors wish to thank Jennifer Matthews and Chris Longmore for their research assistance, Wanda Duarte for her technical assistance, and Mark Soler, David Lambert, and Peter
Leone for their helpful comments during the preparation of this article.
1. In 1899, Illinois enacted the Juvenile Court Act which provided that the court was to
afford the child "the care, custody and discipline" which would "approximate as nearly as may
be that which should have been given by its parents." 1899 Ill. Laws 131.
2. Although status offenders and neglected children are seldom placed in state training
schools today, institutions remain the primary placement for delinquent children. See 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 5663(a)(12)(A), 5667(b)(2)(G) (West Supp. 1995) (requiring states receiving federal
grants to have programs which do not place neglected children or status offenders in detention
or correctional facilities).
3. For a historical analysis of treatment practices in the training schools, see DAVID J.
RoTHmAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE, Tim AsYLuM AND ITS ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (1980).

4. When one of the authors began practicing law in the District of Columbia, the institutions were called Oak Hill, Maple Glen, and Cedar Knoll. As a result of litigation, two have
been closed, and the remaining one is operated with a monitor.
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tion accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative treatment
postulated for children." 5
Between 1972 and 1982, in an effort to ameliorate wretched institutional
conditions, advocates for children filed suits in state and federal courts arguing that children confined in state training schools had both a statutory and
constitutional "right to treatment." Although the cases produced few court
opinions, the litigation induced many state and county governments to improve the conditions in state training schools.
The proponents of a right to treatment asserted that if a state takes custody of a child for a rehabilitative purpose, it must provide treatment to effectuate that rehabilitation. This assertion had historical validity. The
rehabilitation of wayward children was the goal of the Progressive Reformers
who led the juvenile court movement. 6 The Progressives sought the creation
of a juvenile court which would act as parenspatriae, that is, "parent of the

country."'7 In the Progressives' view, the juvenile court judge was not to adjudicate and sentence the youth, but was to identify the conditions which had
led him astray and to "treat" him for those conditions. 8 The treatment provided would be guidance and care to steer the youth away from a life of
crime and immorality.9 Thus, the original and subsequent juvenile court statutes promised that children who were removed from their families by a judge
5. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 (1966) (citing Joel F. Handler, The Juvenile
Court and the Adversary System: Problems of Function and Form, 1965 Wis. L. REV. 7, 12
(1965); David R. Barret et al., Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV.775, 775 (1966)). For congressional material attesting to the
impossible burden placed on juvenile court judges, see Mr. McMillan, Amending the Juvenile
Court Act for the Districtof Columbia, H.R. REP. No. 1041, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. V.6 74,351
(1961); Mr. Hartke, Providing for the Appointment of Two Additional Judges for the Juvenile
Court of the District of Columbia, S. REP. No. 841, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. V.5 72,007 (1961); Mr.
Hartke, Providingfor the Appointment of Two Additional Judges for the Juvenile Court of the
District of Columbia, S. REP. No. 116, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. V.1 34,006 (1959).
6. See Julianne P. Sheffer, Serious and HabitualJuvenile Offender Status: Reconciling Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 487 (1995)
(crediting Progressive Reformers with founding juvenile court system and claiming that rehabilitation was exclusive emphasis in designing separate system).
7. Doubts about the doctrinal soundness of importing this chancery concept into a new
court designed to address unlawful behavior have arisen in retrospect but have in no way undermined its vitality as a basis for juvenile court jurisdiction. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16-18
(1967) (reviewing rationale leading to parens patriae doctrine and finding unsatisfactory the results from that doctrine); ANTHONY M. PLA'r, CHILD SAVERS: THE INVENTION OF DELINOUENCY 152-63 (2d ed. 1977) (discussing two ideological perspectives criticizing juvenile court
system).
8. See Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 119 (1909) (advocating
importance of judges in juvenile cases who are "willing and patient enough to search out the
underlying causes of the trouble and to formulate the plan by which, through the cooperation,
ofttimes, of many agencies, the cure may be effected").
9. Id. at 119-20. Mack, an early proponent of juvenile courts, stated most clearly the philosophy of the court. In explaining why the court should not concern itself with issues of guilt or
innocence, Mack said the juvenile court should be concerned with "[w]hat is [the child], how has
he become what he is, and what had best he done in his interest and in the interest of the state to
save him from a down-ward career." Id.
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would receive the care, custody, and discipline that their parents should have
provided.' 0
Relying on the historical promise of the juvenile court and on contemporary cases concerning mental health facilities, judges began to rule that children sent to a state training school had a right to treatment."l The rulings
were based on the purpose clauses of state juvenile codes, the substantive
and procedural prongs of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment.12 Although some courts began to
question the existence of the right as early as 1973,13 the doctrine sustained
14
litigation against state institutions for juveniles throughout the 1970s.
In 1983, the United States Supreme Court wrote its only opinion about
the right to treatment in the case of Youngberg v. Romeo. 15 Although this

case involved a challenge to the training program in a mental retardation
facility, it has affected litigation in the juvenile justice context as well. Similarly, cases beginning with Rhodes v. Chapman16 and continuing through
Farmer v. Brennan,17 which curtailed the scope of the Eighth Amendment in

prison conditions cases, 18 have also had an effect. These opinions have dras10. See, e.g., 1899 I11.Laws 131 (stating that purpose of Juvenile Court Act was to provide
"the care, custody and discipline of a child" which would "approximate as nearly as may be that
which should have been given by its parents").
11. The first case to suggest a right to treatment was Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v.
Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1367 (D.R.I. 1972) (enjoining defendants from practices which were
anti-rehabilitative because they violated juveniles' equal protection and due process rights). In
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court more explicitly upheld the
right to treatment by stating that "[a] new concept of substantive due process is evolving in the
therapeutic realm ....
Its implication is that effective treatment must be the quid pro quo for
society's right to exercise its parens patriae controls." Id. at 600 (quoting Nicholas N. Kittrie,
Can the Right to Treatment Remedy the Ills of the Juvenile Process?, 57 GEO. L.J. 848, 851-52
(1969)).
12. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451,459 (N.D. Ind. 1973) (holding that right to
treatment is guaranteed by Indiana law and United States Constitution), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
13. See New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752,
762 (E.D.N.Y. 1973) (holding that due process does not guarantee right to treatment).
14. Cases continue to be filed even today but far less often than in the earlier period.
15. 457 U.S. 307 (1982). The Court held that the respondent, who was profoundly retarded
and confined to a state mental facility, had a constitutionally protected interest in "minimally
adequate or reasonable training to ensure safety and freedom from undue restraint." Id. at 319,
324. Previously, in 1975, Justice Burger had referred to the legal weakness of the arguments
supporting the right in his concurring opinion in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 587-89
(1975) (Burger, J., concurring).
16. 452 U.S. 337 (1981). The Court held that "double ceiling," which is putting two prisoners in the same cell, did not violate the constitutional protection against cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 349.
17. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
18. Id. at 1984. In Farmer, a transsexual was housed with the general prison population.
The Court held that "a prison official may be held liable under the Eighth Amendment for
denying humane conditions of confinement only if he knows that inmates face a substantial risk
of serious harm and disregards that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it."
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tically limited the prospects for constitutional relief for children residing in
institutions.
While some of the most egregious abuses described in the pleadings and
opinions of the 1970s have abated, many training schools remain ill-equipped
to provide children living in them with the education, behavior modification,
counseling, substance abuse treatment, and the mental and physical health
care they need. The laws of most states still promise such care. In recent
years, however, a wave of legislation increasing the severity with which children who break the law are treated has compromised that promise. Legislatures have introduced punishment into juvenile codes, authorized mandatory
minimum commitments in the juvenile justice system, and expanded the possibilities for prosecuting children in criminal courts. Some juvenile courts
now have the power to impose a criminal sentence as part of a juvenile disposition, with the criminal sentence stayed-either temporarily or permanently-depending upon the youth's performance during the course of the
juvenile disposition. 19
In the face of this ferment, we write this article with several purposes.
We seek to reassess the constitutional right to treatment doctrine, test its
continued validity in light of recent judicial opinions and legislative changes,
and suggest a different formulation of a state's obligation toward delinquent
children in its care. In so doing, we show that although changes in statutes
and judicial opinions will affect the lives of institutionalized children, the far
greater cause for concern is the repeated failure of governments to allocate
resources to effective rehabilitative programs. We will also demonstrate that
even in the harsher juvenile justice system wrought by modern legislatures,
states remain obligated to provide institutionalized children with a program
of care and services that will assist their development. Despite the current
trend, state laws preserve their original rehabilitative goals and form the
heart of delinquent children's right to receive such care and services. Simply
put, states are obligated to serve as the substitute parents they promise to be.
They are responsible, along with parents, for ensuring that the children in
their care master the identifiable skills needed to develop into responsible
and productive adult citizens. This understanding of the state's role accommodates appropriate punishment and accountability alongside care and rehabilitation. Although courts can play a role in overseeing the provision of
these services and in enforcing children's rights to receive them, decisions
made by communities serving as parents will ultimately determine the life
chances of delinquent children.

19. See MrNN. STAT. ANN. § 260.126; TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.04(d)(3). These two statutes
differ significantly. Under the Minnesota law, the adult sentence is not imposed unless the youth
commits a new offense or otherwise violates the juvenile order. Under the Texas law, the court
can order the youth transferred to serve out the adult sentence without making such a finding.
The Virginia legislature recently passed a bill similar to the Minnesota scheme. See Peter Baker,
Bill Takes Hard Line on Youth Crime, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1996, at Al.
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I. EARLY RIGHT TO TREATMENT THEORIES

The notion of a right to treatment can be traced to the historic ideals of
the juvenile court movement. 20 Progressive Reformers in the late nineteenth
century reconceptualized the manner in which society would treat youthful
offenders. 21 The Positivist criminology underlying the first juvenile court in
Illinois and all subsequent juvenile court statutes rejected the notion of free
will and sought the causes of delinquency elsewhere. Believing that children
lacked both the intellectual and moral capacity of adults and that they were
heavily influenced by external pressures resulting from poverty and neglect,
the Reformers sought to change behavior "not through threats of punishment, but by changing the youths' thinking, goals, and values."2 2 Thus, rehabilitation, that is, "treatment services designed to help the child learn to cope
with negative external influences in non-delinquent ways," 23 replaced punishment. This treatment criminology "borrowed both methodology and vocabulary from the medical profession; pathology, infection, diagnosis, and
'24
treatment provided popular analogues for criminal justice professionals.
To both the founders of the juvenile court movement and to the supporters
of the juvenile court in the 1970s, this model and its philosophic underpinnings permit the court to do away with formal legal procedures in exchange
for treatment leading to rehabilitation. Although cases such as Kent v.
United States25 and Schall v. Martin26 recognized the imperfection of the
court and its failure to accomplish its goals,2 7 the basic promise of rehabilita28
tion has remained intact.
20. The story of the creation of the juvenile court has been told often and needs little elaboration here. See, e.g., ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at Ch. 6 (providing historical overview of beginning of juvenile court); Barry C. Feld, The Juvenile Court Meets the Principle of Offense:
Punishment, Treatment and the Difference It Makes, 68 B.U. L. REV. 821, 822 n.4 (1988) (provid-

ing articles regarding history of juvenile court movement).
21. In reality, "offenders" could be children who violated the law, or merely status offenders or children without proper homes.
22. Julianne P. Sheffer, Note, Serious and Habitual Juvenile Offenders Statutes: Reconciling
Punishment and Rehabilitation Within the Juvenile Justice System, 48 VAND. L. REV. 479, 482
(1995).

23. Id.
24. Feld, supra note 20 at 824; see also PLATT, supra note 7 at 141-42 (describing juvenile
court movement as "anti-legal" with role of judges becoming more like that of "doctor-counselor" or "judicial-therapist").

25. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
26. 467 U.S. 253 (1984).
27. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 (expressing concern that "the child receives the worst of both
worlds: that he gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regen-

erative treatment postulated for children"); Schall, 467 U.S. at 263 (stating that Court has attempted to respect informality and flexibility of juvenile proceedings and at same time ensure
that juvenile is afforded due process).
28. Even new statutes recognizing punishment and accountability recognize the rehabilitation purpose. See infra section IV for a discussion of statutes that provide for rehabilitation.
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The harsh reality of juvenile court, condemned by the United States
Supreme Court in Kent 29 and In re Gault30 spawned a cadre of lawyers and
scholars who attacked the operation not only of the court, but also of the
31
reformatories and training schools where children were sent for treatment.
Seeking a legal basis to challenge the conditions of confinement, lawyers for
children returned to the roots of the juvenile court movement, combined the
rehabilitative ideal with emerging constitutional doctrines from cases challenging the lack of rehabilitation services in mental health facilities, and developed a constitutionally based right to treatment for children adjudicated
delinquent 32 in the juvenile court. 33 Although the number of cases reported
was small, 34 the reasoning in these opinions formed the basis of numerous
29. See Kent, 383 U.S. at 556 (stating that juvenile proceedings are often arbitrary).
30. See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1967) (stating that juvenile court system often results
in unfair, inefficient, ineffective, and arbitrary proceedings).
31. See ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 261-89 (describing conditions that prevailed in institutions between 1899 and 1960s).
32. Plaintiffs in these law suits were also status offenders and neglected children. Throughout the remainder of this article, the term "delinquent" will be used to include all children
housed in training schools even though the term may be imprecise in a particular case.
33. Several academic commentators also supported changes to the conditions of confinement. See generally Lewis Kapner, Juvenile's Right to Treatment-the Next Step, 47 FLA. B.J. 228
(1973) (reviewing changes in procedure and individualized treatment for juveniles); Kittrie,
supra note 10 (contrasting ideals upon which juvenile court was founded with contemporary
reality and arguing that a true right to treatment will remain unrealized until accepted by legislatures, executives, and public); Michael H. Langley et al., The Juvenile Court and Individualized
Treatment, 18 CRIME & DELINO. 79 (1972) (discussing study that concluded that juvenile court
system continued to rely heavily on pre-trial detention and did not provide legal representation
for juveniles at hearings even in light of Gault); Dominic Lasok, The Treatment of the Young
Offender, 116 NEW L.J. 209 (1965) (detailing considerations of the family in legislation and
changing from criminal to civil system); Paul D. Lipstitt, Due Process as a Gateway to Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Justice System, 49 B.U. L. REV. 62 (1969) (discussing importance of need for
appropriate screening of juvenile cases and development and implementation of innovative
treatment programs); Carl P. Malmquist, Juvenile Detention: Right and Adequacy of Treatment
Issues, 7 LAW & Soc. REV. 159 (1972) (questioning argument that rationale for juvenile detention is treatment); John P. Pyfer, Juvenile's Right to Treatment, 6 FAM. L.Q. 279 (1972) (reviewing procedural and substantive rights of juveniles); Donna E. Renn, The Right to Treatment and
the Juvenile, 19 CRIME & DELINO. 477 (1973) (examining theoretical basis, legal foundations,
and application of juveniles' right to treatment); Albert W. Silver, Retooling for Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Rehabilitation in Juvenile Courts, 30 FED. PROB. 29 (1966) (identifying
conditions inherent in juvenile court systems which hamper their effectiveness in two of
America's largest cities); Patricia M. Wald & Lawrence H. Schwartz, Trying a Juvenile Right to
Treatment Suit: Pointers and Pitfalls for Plaintiffs, 12 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 125 (1974) (explaining
practical aspects of right to treatment); Mayer N. Zald & David Street, Custody and Treatment in
Juvenile Institutions, 10 CRIME & DELINO. 249 (1964) (analyzing organizational patterns and
problems of juvenile correctional facilities with regard to their goals of providing custody and
rehabilitation); William S. Bailey & John F. Pyfer Jr., Note, Deprivationof Liberty and the Right
to Treatment, 7 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 519 (1974) (discussing aspects of juvenile justice institutionalization and treatment).
34. See generally Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (challenging conditions of confining delinquents on Eighth Amendment grounds); Pefla v. Division of Youth, 419
F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (challenging conditions of confinement including use of isolation,
hands and feet restraint, and tranquilizers on Eighth Amendment grounds), aff'd, 708 F.2d 877
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lawsuits and threats of lawsuits seeking to improve the physical conditions
and rehabilitation programs in many juvenile treatment centers.
Right to treatment cases were of two types. The first type involved basic
concepts of human decency. For example, the cases of Nelson v. Heyne, 35
38
37
Morgan v. Sproat,36 Pefla v. Division of Youth, and Morales v. Turman

involved challenges to institutional conditions such as the use of corporal
punishment, disciplinary isolation, mechanical restraints, tranquilizers and
tear gas, in addition to inadequate medical and dental care, invidious discrimination based on race and national origin, and overcrowding. 39 The second
type of claim challenged the failure of the juvenile justice system's treatment
regimen to live up to its quasi-medical pretensions. Plaintiffs attacked the
lack of services, such as psychiatric and psychological treatment, group and
individual counselling, health care, and education, that would be required in
an effective rehabilitation program. Such quasi-medical claims were litigated
(2d Cir. 1983); Santiago v. City of Philadelphia, 72 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (challenging conditions including corporal punishment, solitary confinement, denial of adequate education and
rehabilitation, and racial segregation on First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth
Amendment grounds); McRedmond v. Wilson, 402 F. Supp. 1087 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (challenging
conditions of confinement for "Persons in Need of Supervision" on grounds that failure to provide adequate and appropriate treatment violated rights to due process, equal protection, and
protection from cruel and unusual punishment), aff'd in part,rev'd in part, 533 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.
1976); Swansey v. Elrod, 386 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. I11.1975) (challenging conditions of confining
juveniles awaiting adult criminal prosecution on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection
grounds and Eighth Amendment protection from cruel and unusual punishment); Morales v.
Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (challenging conditions on cruel and unusual punishment grounds under state and Federal Constitution), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th
Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (per curiam); Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.
Ky. 1972) (challenging detention of juveniles prior to finding of criminal guilt on Fourteenth
Amendment grounds because juveniles were deprived of rehabilitative care and treatment); Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972) (challenging confinement of juveniles in adult correctional facilities on Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment grounds);
Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (challenging conditions of confinement of
non-criminal juveniles on grounds that it was cruel and unusual punishment, violated rights to
due process, and violated equal protection rights because confinement was arbitrary and capricious); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (challenging conditions including
corporal punishment, use of tranquilizers, solitary confinement, and mail censorship), aff'd, 491
F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Lollis v. Department of Social Servs., 322 F.
Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (challenging, on Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment
Due Process grounds, practice of isolating children for long periods of time).
35. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd, 491 F.2d 353 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
36. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
37. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd, 708 F.2d 877 (2d Cir. 1983).
38. 383 F. Supp. 53 (E.D. Tex. 1974), rev'd on proceduralgrounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir.
1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977).
39. See Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1155 (challenging lack of dental and medical care); Pefla,
419 F. Supp. at 204 (challenging isolation, mechanical restraints, and tranquilizers); Morales, 383
F. Supp. at 73-75 (challenging physical brutality and abuse, use of tear gas, and racial segregation); Nelson, 355 F. Supp. at 454 (challenging corporal punishment, control-tranquilizing drugs,
solitary confinement, mail censorship, and religious services).
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in Nelson v. Heyne, 40 Morgan v. Sproat,41 Martarellav. Kelley, 42 Inmates of
the Boys' Training Schools v. Affleck, 43 and Morales v. Truman.44 The law-

yers in these cases crafted their arguments with the rhetoric of the Progressive Reformers. Once the pathology, i.e., the commission of the crime, was
evident, its cause was to be diagnosed and an individualized treatment plan
of programs applied so that a cure, i.e., rehabilitation, could take place. In
the various cases, the plaintiffs showed that treatment plans were seldom produced and that little actual treatment was provided. Thus, the cure-rehabilitation-could not take place.
Several legal sources were cited to support the children's claims for relief. For example, judges ruling in early cases like Creek v. Stone,4 5 In re
Elmore46 and Nelson v. Heyne 47 found support for the right to treatment in
the state juvenile court statutes. 48 The guarantee of the right to treatment
was also found in both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution. Two views of the Eighth Amendment prevailed. 49 Some courts,
like that in Martarella, believed that a right to treatment existed within the
Eighth Amendment. 50 Others, like the court in Affleck, found no right to
treatment in the Eight Amendment but, instead, held that the challenged
conditions violated the state constitution's cruel and unusual punishment
51
clause.
The Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause also provided two bases for the right to treatment. The first, known as the "quid pro quo" theory,
40. Nelson, 355 F. Supp. at 354 (challenging use of tranquilizers).
41. Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1155 (attacking lack of medical and dental care).
42. 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (attacking institutional conditions that constituted
punishment, not rehabilitation), supplemented, 359 F. Supp. 478 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
43. 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1357 (D.R.I. 1972) (challenging lack of vocational training, drugrehabilitation program, and psychiatric counseling).
44. 383 F. Supp. 53, 73 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (challenging lack of medical treatment following
tear gas exposure), rev'd on proceduralgrounds, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322
(1977).
45. 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
46. 382 F.2d 125 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
47. 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1973), aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S.
976 (1974).
48. See id. at 459 (holding state statute entitles juveniles to right to treatment); Elmore, 382
F.2d at 127 (declaring that denial of needed psychological or psychiatric treatment is "substantial
complaint" worthy of "appropriate inquiry"); Creek, 379 F.2d at 109 (interpreting District of
Columbia Code as requiring psychiatric and medical treatment when appropriate).
49. Courts relying on the Eighth Amendment recognized that the Supreme Court had never
applied it to the juvenile court. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 669 & n.37 (1977)
(holding that Eighth Amendment was not applicable to paddling of school children).
50. Martarella v. Kelley, 359 F. Supp. 478, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). The reasoning is convoluted. The court believed that because children were committed for treatment, holding them
without treatment for longer than 30 days would become a cruel and unusual punishment. Id.
Therefore, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment in tandem with the state juvenile code created the right to treatment.
51. Inmates of Boys' Training Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1366-67 (D.R.I. 1972).
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was endorsed by the courts in Morales, Nelson, and Sproat.52 This theory
states that a juvenile must receive rehabilitative treatment in exchange for
receiving fewer procedural protections at a delinquency trial than would an
adult in a criminal trial. 53 The other Fourteenth Amendment theory used to
support a right to treatment was the right to substantive due process. In
Jackson v. Indiana,54 the United States Supreme Court stated that "[a]t the
least, due process requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear
some reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is committed."'55 From this language, the courts in Sproat, Morales, and other cases
declared that treatment-the announced purpose of state custody-must be
provided lest that custody devolve into a purely arbitrary exercise of govern56
mental authority over an involuntarily committed juvenile delinquent.
The relief requested in these cases was extensive. Not only did the plaintiffs seek to enjoin abusive practices and control overcrowding, but they
sought to tell juvenile corrections officials how to operate viable treatment
programs. 57 In many cases, experts in mental health care, drug treatment,
medicine, education, architecture, crime prevention, rehabilitation programming, and accreditation testified not only about the shortcomings of the institutions but about the need to provide specific rehabilitative programs. The
testimony concerning the physical dangers in the facilities and their lack of
rehabilitative programming shocked the judges, 58 who responded by issuing
52. See Morgan v. Sproat, 432 F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (S.D. Miss. 1977) (stating that due process required that juveniles deprived of full panoply of due process safeguards only be incarcerated for "beneficient rather than punitive reasons"); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 71
(E.D. Tex. 1974) (asserting that confinement of juveniles only for rehabilitation is quid pro quo
for eliminating procedural safeguards of criminal process), rev'd on proceduralgrounds, 535 F.2d
864 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1977) (per curiam); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451
(N.D. Ind. 1972) (balancing lack of procedural right with interests of treating juveniles), aff'd,
491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
53. This comparison between criminal and delinquency cases was also used to support an
equal protection argument for a right to treatment. See Rouse v. Chapman, 373 F.2d 451, 453
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (noting that involuntary commission to mental institution would violate Equal
Protection Clause if no treatment provided); Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964)
(same).
54. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
55. Id. at 738.
56. Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1135; Morales, 383 F. Supp. at 118-19.
57. See, e.g., Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1148 (enjoining defendant from operating deficient
rehabilitation and ordering defendant to submit plan for corrective actions); Martarella v. Kelly,
359 F. Supp. 478, 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (finding that court has authority to specify required standards of care in cases involving disadvantaged institutional inmates); Inmates of Boys' Training
Sch. v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354, 1374 (D.R.I. 1972) (recommending rehabilitative treatment
through vocational training, drug rehabilitation programs, and psychiatric counseling).
58. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 354 n.3, 356 (7th Cir.) (stating that staff routinely beat juveniles with wooden stick causing one to "sleep on his face for three days, with
black, blue, and numb buttocks," and staff injected juveniles with tranquilizers to control behavior), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1138 (stating that juveniles with
"discipline problems" were placed in rooms with "no windows, furnishings or slab for sleeping"
and only available toilet was a "hole in the floor with a flushing mechanism located outside the
cell"); Martarella, 359 F. Supp. at 480 (stating that some of facility's plumbing was unusable,
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sweeping remedial orders. Monitors were appointed to make independent
assessments of agency activities; 59 buildings were closed; 60 baseline condi62
tions of confinement were established; 6 1 disciplinary codes were imposed;
diagnostic and evaluation procedures were required and individualized treatment plans were created; 63 staff-inmate ratios were imposed and staff training was required; 64 the hiring of new medical, mental health, and drug
counsellors was ordered; 65 and educational and vocational training was required. 66 Agencies were ordered to go to their legislatures to request more
67
money.
The courts continued to monitor these cases for many years, involving
themselves in the day-to-day operations of the facilities. Similar results were
obtained in many other unreported cases. 68 Thus, the constitutional right to
treatment appeared to provide not only a sufficient legal theory for challengroofs leaked, and plaster was falling off the walls); Affleck, 346 F. Supp. at 1359-60 (stating that
juveniles were not allowed outside exercise and were provided minimal education and medical
care).
59. District of Columbia v. Jerry M., 571 A.2d 178, 181 (D.C. 1990).
60. See, e.g., Martarella,359 F. Supp. at 483 (mandating closure of detention center); Affleck, 346 F. Supp. at 1365 (finding conditions deplorable, particularly inhuman solitary confinement cells).
61. See, e.g., Affleck, 346 F. Supp. at 1373 (ordering defendant to provide conditions substantially the same as minimal conditions for adult inmates).
62. See, e.g., Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1134 (ordering provision of procedural safeguards
such as prior notice, impartial evidentiary hearing, and new code of rules governing student
conduct); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 84-85 (E.D. Tex. 1974) (ordering juvenile confinement permissible only on determination of "exceptional dangerousness" established by psychological testing and thorough review of juvenile's history), rev'd on other grounds, 535 F.2d 993
(5th Cir.), rev'd, 430 U.S. 322 (1976).
63. See, e.g., Nelson v. Heyne, 491 F.2d 352, 360 (7th Cir.) (finding individual treatment
plans required due to differing needs for rehabilitation), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1143 (requiring regular procedures to determine progress toward juvenile's
treatment objective); Morales, 383 F. Supp. at 105 (concluding that juveniles have constitutional
right to medical and psychiatric care meeting minimally acceptable professional standards);
Martarella,359 F. Supp. at 485 (ordering evaluation taking into consideration factors such as:
emotional development, psychiatric history, charges, drug use, development of written treatment
plan).
64. See, e.g., Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1146 (requiring defendants to submit plan for program
of pre-service and regular in-service training for staff); Morales, 383 F. Supp. at 90 (ordering
defendants to hire bilingual personnel and special education teachers and to institute in-service
staff training and minimum student-teacher ratios).
65. See, e.g., Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1157 (ordering minimum medical, dental, and mental
health standards and increased staffing to provide emergency and on-going care); Morales, 383
F. Supp. at 105 (ordering upgrading of staff to meet minimally acceptable professional
standards).
66. See, e.g., Morales, 383 F. Supp. at 92 (finding that juveniles must have adequate employability plan including job placement, on-the-job training, and adequate support services).
67. See, e.g., Morgan, 432 F. Supp. at 1150 (ordering defendants to report back to court with
regard to action taken by state legislature on request for capital improvements).
68. See Alexander v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 778 n.5 (D.S.C. 1995) (finding few litigated
cases challenging juvenile correctional facility conditions because most settled before trial).
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ing conditions, but a potent weapon for revamping the entire juvenile justice
system.
To recap, throughout the 1970s, four theories-(1) state legislative purpose; (2) procedural due process; (3) substantive due process; and (4) the
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment-formed the bases of a
child's right to treatment while residing in a juvenile corrections facility.
While some of the theories supporting the right to treatment were questioned
as early as 197369 and 197470 in mental health cases and in 1977 in the juvenile justice system, 71 the right to treatment remained a powerful constitutional claim to improve the conditions in juvenile training schools until the
early 1980s.
II.

THE DEMISE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT

The demise of the right to treatment as a basis for improving conditions
in juvenile treatment centers came not from a direct assault on the doctrine
but from a convergence of judicial resistance to attacks on other systems. In
Youngberg v. Romeo, 72 the United States Supreme Court delineated the substantive due process rights that were retained by a profoundly mentally retarded adult who had been involuntarily committed. 73 Romeo had claimed a
right to safe conditions, freedom from bodily restraints, and minimally adequate habilitation. 74 Habilitation was defined as training and development
76
of needed skills. 75 The Court easily acceded to Romeo's first two claims,
77
but it ruled narrowly on the issue of his right to training. Recognizing that
Romeo's condition precluded release, the Court acknowledged his right to be
69. Burnham v. Department of Pub. Health, 349 F. Supp. 1335, 1339-40 (N.D. Ga. 1972)
(finding no constitutional right to treatment for the mentally ill), rev'd, 503 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.
1974).
70. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 588-89 (1975) (Burger, J., concurring) (finding
no basis to equate "right to treatment" with constitutional right prohibiting confinement without
due process).
71. See Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993, 997-99 (5th Cir. 1977) (finding no "right to treatment" for juveniles committing acts that would otherwise result in detention if committed by
adults).
72. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
73. Romeo's mother had sought the involuntary commitment of her 33-year-old son. There
was no dispute that he was unable to care for himself outside of the facility. He had the mental
capacity of an 18-month-old child, could not talk, and could not perform basic self-care skills.
Id. at 309.
74. Id. at 310. Romeo had been injured more than 60 times because of his own violence
and violence directed at him. Id.
75. Id. at 309 n.1.
76. See id. at 315-16 (finding constitutional right to safe conditions of confinement and freedom from bodily restraint) (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 403 U.S. 651, 673 (1977) (finding right to
personal safety); Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 18 (1979) (finding right to
freedom from bodily restraints)).
77. Id at 317 n.19. The Court did not address whether a substantive due process right was
based on the state statutory entitlement to care and treatment. Id. at 318 n.23. This more
sweeping claim had been abandoned at the court of appeals level. Id.
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trained but endorsed it only as it related to his safety and to his freedom from
restraint within the institution. 78 The Court further limited relief to minimally adequate training 79 and ordered that the lower courts defer to the
80
judgments of the professionals about what kind of training was necessary.
Finally, the Court saw no need to rule on whether a person involuntarily
committed to a state institution had some general constitutional right to
81
training per se.
Several lower courts have addressed the right to treatment for persons
committed to juvenile training school since Youngberg was decided. 82 In addition to applying the Youngberg rationale, courts in those cases have considered the "quid pro quo" theory 83 and the Jackson v. Indiana84 theory as well.

The "quid pro quo" theory has not fared well. 85 Although courts have recognized the procedural differences between juvenile delinquency and adult
criminal cases, they have rejected the notion that such differences require
that treatment be provided.8 6 They do so because the Supreme Court has
ruled that the demands of due process differ in different situations and that
the acknowledged distinctions are constitutionally acceptable in juvenile
78. Id. at 317-19.
79. Id. at 322.
80. Id. at 322-23.
81. Id. at 321 n.27. The Court did not need to address Romeo's right to training that would
have enabled him to live outside the institution because the purpose for the commitment was to
provide care he never could have obtained while living outside of the institution. No amount of
training would have made his release possible. Id. at 317.
82. See Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding juvenile detainees
protected by Fourteenth Amendment right to treatment); Milonas v. Williams, 691 F.2d 931, 942
(10th Cir. 1982) (holding that confined juveniles retain liberty interests protected by Fourteenth
Amendment, including reasonably safe conditions, freedom from unreasonable bodily restraints,
and adequate training), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1069 (1983); Alexander v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773,
797-98 (D.S.C. 1995) (same); B.H. v. Johnson, 715 F. Supp. 1387, 1395 (N.D. II1. 1989) (holding
that juveniles have right to be provided with adequate food, shelter, medical care and minimally
adequate training); Hendrickson v. Griggs, 672 F. Supp. 1126, 1134 (N.D. Iowa 1987) (finding
that Iowa legislature intended to confer special benefits upon distinct class of detained
juveniles), appeal dismissed, 856 F.2d 1041 (8th Cir. 1990); Doe v. Strauss, No. 84-C2315, 1986
WL 4108 at *4 (N.D. I11.March 28, 1986) (holding that juveniles have right to therapy reasonably
designed to effect rehabilitation and proper development); Stamps-Bey v. Thomas, 618 F. Supp.
1122, 1125 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding legitimate right to treatment under Due Process Clause),
aff'd, 788 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1986); Santana v. Collazo, 533 F. Supp. 966, 992 (D.P.R. 1982) (finding
no constitutional obligation to provide rehabilitative treatment to juveniles), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1985); State v. S.H., 877
P.2d 205, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that juvenile offenders have right to adequate
treatment under Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment).
83. See supra note 53 and accompanying text for a discussion of the "quid pro quo" theory.
84. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the Jackson theory.
85. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 585-87 (Burger, J., concurring) (finding
"quid pro quo" justification defective and inconsistent with Fourteenth Amendment when due
process rights not observed during confinement).
86. See, e.g., Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1177 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding right to treatment not mandated because rehabilitative treatment is not sole legitimate purpose of juvenile
confinement), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
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court proceedings. 87 The Jackson claim has fared no better. During the

1980s and 1990s, state legislators and the public have emphasized the need to
protect the public from delinquent children and to hold children accountable
for their criminal behavior. 88 Legislatures in many states have enacted
changes in the purpose clauses of juvenile court statutes. Although one may
argue that punishment and societal protection have always been part of the
juvenile court,8 9 newer statutes specifically require that the court protect the
community while rehabilitating a delinquent child. 90 Thus, even if "the nature and duration of commitment must bear some reasonable relation to the
purpose for which the individual is committed," 9 1 incarceration for the protection of the community, a stated purpose of the juvenile court, meets that
standard. 92 Nothing additional by way of treatment is constitutionally
required.
Although the Youngberg ruling has slowed the filing of right to treatment suits, it has provided some protection to incarcerated children. For example, in Santana v. Collazo,93 the court required the territory of Puerto
Rico to provide minimally adequate training to avoid the use of unnecessary
bodily restraints. 94 The Santana court also used the Youngberg Court's con-

87. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971) (holding that jury trials are not
required in delinquency cases).
88. Actually, crimes committed by children have been decreasing for years. See FEDERAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS FOR THE
UNITED STATES 217 (1993) (finding that 17% of arrests nationally involved persons under the
age of 18; 30% involved persons under the age of 21). Violent crime committed by children,

however, has increased. See

OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION,

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS, PROGRAM SUMMARY 1-2 (1994) (finding increase in violent juvenile crime

resulting in increased juvenile caseload).
89. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 264-65 (1985) (finding that juvenile system acts as
"preventive detention" by protecting child and society from consequences of juvenile's criminal
acts); McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 546 n.6 (refusing to abandon juvenile system and finding no cause to
adjudicate juvenile offenses in criminal court); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 15 (1967) (noting that
traditional role of juvenile system was to "treat" and "rehabilitate," not penalize).
90. See, e.g., CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202 (West 1984 & Supp. 1995) (stating that statute's purpose is to provide protection and safety both to public and each minor in juvenile
system).
91. Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
92. See Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1176-77 (1st Cir. 1983) (holding that removal of
juvenile from dangerous or unhealthy environment is legitimate exercise of state's parenspatriae
authority), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984). But see Alexander v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 796
(D.S.C. 1995) (holding that purpose of confining juveniles was to provide training to correct
delinquent behavior).
93. 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
94. Id. at 1182. The restraint in this case was long-term isolation. Id. at 1182 n.7. See also
Alexander, 876 F. Supp. at 798 (holding that freedom from unreasonable restraint includes freedom from unnecessary bodily restraint as well as "unreasonably restrictive conditions of
confinement").
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cern for a safe environment as the basis for removing fire hazards. 95 Some
courts have used the rationale of Youngberg to rule that children are entitled
to minimum care 9 6 and other courts have ruled that the Eighth Amendment
concern for humane care is subsumed into the Fourteenth Amendment by
virtue of Youngberg's right to safe care and freedom from restraint.9 7
98
The most interesting recent ruling appears in Alexander S. v. Boyd.
There, the court specifically looked to the purpose of the juvenile court and
found that Romeo required that children receive training that provides them
with a
reasonable opportunity to accomplish the purpose of their confinement, to protect the safety of the juveniles and the staff, and to ensure the safety of the community once the juveniles are ultimately
released. Minimally adequate program services should be designed
to teach juveniles the basic principles that are essential to correcting
their conduct. These generally recognized principles include: (1)
taking responsibility for the consequence of their actions; (2) learning appropriate ways of responding to others (coping skills); (3)
learning to manage their anger; and (4) developing a positive sense
of accomplishment. 99
This ruling is interesting for two reasons. First, unlike the court in
Youngberg, the Alexander S. court envisioned training or treatment in relation to the outside world, not in relation to life inside the institution. 1°° Second, in no right to treatment case before Alexander S. did a judge specifically
state the purpose of treatment. While all the cases speak about the need for
rehabilitation and many set forth the instrumentalities by which it is to occur,
none suggests the normative goals of treatment and none defines rehabilitation. To some extent, the absence of definition and goals reflects the flaw in
using the medical model in juvenile court. Although the symptoms of criminality are obvious, the causes are not. There is virtually no unanimity in the
95. Santana, 714 F.2d at 1183. See also Alexander, 876 F. Supp. at 786 (holding that use of
individual padlocks on cells created unreasonable infringement on juveniles' safety in case of

fire).
96. See, e.g., In re V.H., 554 N.E.2d 686, 690 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that constitution recognizes liberty interest requiring minimally adequate care and treatment of confined juveniles),
cert. denied, 561 N.E.2d 709 (I11.1990).
97. See Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that Fourteenth
Amendment applied to confinement when no conviction involved and that Due Process Clause,
which implicitly incorporates the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause, is constitutionally minimal standard); Alexander, 876 F. Supp. at 796 (finding that absent conviction, Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process Clause, encompassing protections of Eighth Amendment, is appropriate standard for juveniles); Santana, 714 F.2d at 1179 (holding that Eighth Amendment standard
prohibiting cruel and unusual conditions inadequate to cover juvenile detainees which required
closer scrutiny of confinement conditions than that accorded convicted criminals).
98. 876 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1995).
99. Id. at 790.

100. See id. (holding that appropriate programming can substantially enhance juveniles' opportunity to succeed on release from confinement). See supra note 81 and accompanying text
for a discussion of why the Romeo Court did not have to rule on a right to training.
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social sciences regarding the cause of crime.1 0 1 Many conditions, external
and internal to the individual, show correlations to anti-social behavior but
causation cannot be proven. Because the causes are elusive, the treatment is
imprecise at best. While some programs have been shown to reduce
crime, 10 2 none can claim great success or universal utility. Even those that
show success in the aggregate cannot necessarily predict success in a specific
case. The Progressives favored a treatment modality that would provide
skills and inculcate responsibility through work and strict discipline and assumed that it would cure crime. 10 3 However, little is certain about its success
rate. 10 Modern theorists sought psychosocial treatment modalities rather
than work and strict discipline, and assumed that this would cure crime. All
reflected the thinking of their times.10 5 Nonetheless, the "disease" has not
been cured.
In any case, Alexander S. stands alone in suggesting the purpose of treatment. Alexander S. reflects both rehabilitative concerns as well as societal
protection concerns. It stresses competencies to be achieved and services to
be provided. It also has the realizable goal of affecting behaviors which correlate to criminal activity.
As was noted earlier, several courts have recently tried to incorporate
Eighth Amendment concerns, a constitutional source of the right to treatment in early cases, into the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment. 106
Courts that have done so believe that the scrutiny given to conditions relating
to personal safety and physical restraints in treatment facilities is more exact101. See generally CLIFFORD E. SIMONSEN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN AMERICA (3d ed. 1991)
(discussing validity of various proposed causes of criminality).
102. See Milton S. Eisenhower Found., Report, Youth Involvement and Community Reconstruction: Street Lessons on Drugs and Crime, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 503,
558-62 (1991) (discussing several youth programs that challenge myth that "nothing works" with
disadvantaged youth).
103. See PLAT'r, supra note 7, at 67-74 (discussing remedial value of skill development and
training); ROTHMAN supra note 3, at 264-65 (discussing rehabilitation methods successful with
juveniles).
104. See ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at ch. 8 (discussing outcomes of various skills training
approaches).
105. By 1910, psychologists and psychiatrists had endorsed the juvenile court, and guidance
clinics appeared around 1930. Id. at 215. However, in reality, mental health treatment seldom
existed. By 1980, courts and standard setting groups had accepted such services as essential to
the prevention of crime and to rehabilitation. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL ADVISORY
COMMITT-EE FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, REPORT, STANDARDS FOR

THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSncE, 12-15 (1980) (arguing that comprehensive health
plan must include preventive and diagnostic services which can significantly affect juvenile's
health and emotional well-being).
106. See, e.g., Gary H. v. Hegstrom, 831 F.2d 1430, 1432 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment protected juvenile detainees); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1179 (1st
Cir. 1983) (holding that Eighth Amendment standard prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment
inadequate to protect juvenile offenders), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1985); Alexander v. Boyd,
876 F. Supp. 773, 796 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
encompassing Eighth Amendment protections was appropriate standard for juveniles).
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ing than that given to conditions in penal institutions.107 Given recent cases
concerning the application of the Eighth Amendment to prison conditions,
such incorporation is wise. In a line of cases beginning with Rhodes v. Chapman,10 8 the United States Supreme Court has curtailed the use of the Eighth
Amendment to challenge conditions of confinement. 10 9 In Rhodes, the
Court reiterated that non-barbarous punishments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" 110 violate the Eighth Amendment, and
that the "evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
society""' remain the standard for evaluating cruel and unusual punishments. Nonetheless, the Court in Rhodes showed a reluctance to brand overcrowded prison conditions unconstitutional. Further, the Court noted that
"[t]o the extent that such conditions are restrictive or even harsh, they are
part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against
society."112
In Wilson v. Seiter,113 the United States Supreme Court looked at the
actions of the prison administrators rather than at the conditions of the
prison themselves when addressing claims based on the Eighth Amendment. 1 14 In Wilson, the Court held that intent is critical to an Eighth
Amendment claim 1 5 and that a plaintiff must show that a prison official acted with deliberate indifference towards the claimant before a prison condition can amount to cruel and unusual punishment. 116 Two years later, in
Farmer v. Brennan,1 7 the Supreme Court emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment was about punishment and not prison conditions." 8 While rec-

ognizing that the Eighth Amendment required that prisoners receive ade107. The Santana court did note, however, that the distinction between conditions imposed
for order and safety and those imposed for punishment may be a fine one. Santana, 714 F.2d at
1179.
108. 452 U.S. 337, 347-48 (1981).
109. Congress has also recently curtailed the use of the Eighth Amendment to challenge
conditions of confinement. In 1994, Congress passed the Violent Crime Control Act. A provision of this act states that jail or prison crowding can be found unconstitutional only if it inflicts
cruel and unusual punishment on a particular inmate and relief for such a violation must be
limited to the removal of the condition. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1) (1994). The 104th Congress is
also currently considering bills.that would limit prisoners' relief in prison conditions cases to the
removal of that condition, require prisoners to show that crowding is the primary cause of the
deprivation of individual rights, terminate all consent decrees regarding prison conditions within
two years after they were made or after the act is passed, and limit attorneys' fees so that no
monitoring fees could be awarded. S. 400, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995); H.R. 667, 104th Cong.,
1st Sess. tit. III (1995).
110. Rhodes, 452 U.S. at 345 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
111: Id. (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
112. Id. at 347.
113. 501 U.S. 294 (1991).
114. Id. at 296.
115. Id. at 301.
116. Id. at 303.
117. 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994).
118. Id. at 1974.
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quate food, shelter, clothing and medical services. 119 the Court stated that a
prison official's failure to provide such humane treatment becomes a cruel
and unusual punishment only if the deprivation is, objectively, sufficiently
knows of and disregards the excessive risk
serious 120 and if the prison official
121
to the inmate's health or safety.
In light of Youngberg and recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, the
constitutional right to treatment for confined juveniles has lost much of its
doctrinal foundation. As currently understood, the Fourteenth and Eighth
Amendments require only freedom from unnecessary restraint and minimally humane conditions of confinement. Food, clothing, shelter and medical care must only be adequate enough to avoid harm.' 22 In the main,
treatment or training is directed at little more than preserving the peace
within the training school.
Moreover, to the extent that a violation of even these minimal standards
occurs, federal judges are precluded from issuing sweeping corrective injunctions by the "hands off" doctrine. 123 As early as 1974, the United States
Supreme Court began to show great deference to prison administrators and
to tell trial court judges to refrain from interfering with the day-to-day operations of prisons.124 Both principles were spelled out forcefully in Bell v.
Wolfish.125 In Bell, the Supreme Court recognized that pre-trial detainees
have constitutional rights, but stated that by virtue of their situation, they do
not possess the full range of freedoms possessed by an unincarcerated person
and that a mutual accommodation must exist between the constitutionally
26
protected rights of the inmate and the legitimate needs of the institution.'
Further, if an institutional restriction impinged on a specific constitutional
guarantee, the Court said that the practice must be evaluated in light of the
119. Id. at 1976.
120. Id. at 1977.
121. Id. at 1979.
122. Since Farmer, federal courts of appeals have addressed Eighth Amendment challenges
to prison conditions. See Williams v. Delo, 49 F.3d 442, 445 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that placement of prisoner in cell for four days without bedding and clothing did not violate Eighth
Amendment); Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 271 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that overcrowding

must present inmates with substantial risk of harm in order to constitute Eighth Amendment
violation); Raine v. Williford, 32 F.3d 1024, 1035 (7th Cir. 1994) (holding that low temperatures
in prisoner's cell created a substantial enough risk of harm to meet threshold requirement of
claiming Eighth Amendment violation).
123. See Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 404 (1974) (noting that federal courts traditionally take broad hands-off attitude towards problems of prison administration), overruled on
other grounds by Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989).

124. See, e.g., id. at 404-05 (noting that courts are ill-equipped to deal with increasingly
difficult problems of prison administration and reform); Procunier v. Pell, 417 U.S. 817, 827
(1974) (stating that although courts cannot abdicate constitutional responsibilities, courts should

defer to expert judgment of corrections officials).
125. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). This case concerned conditions of confinement for pre-trial
detainees.

126. Id. at 546.

1808

TEMPLE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 68

prison administrator's need to safeguard the institution. 127 Finally, the Court
indicated that because the problems arising in the operation of a prison do
not lend themselves to easy solutions, and because such considerations fall
within the expertise of prison officials, courts should normally defer to their
professional judgment. 128 In its concluding paragraphs, the Court chastised
trial judges who had become "enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations,"'1 29 and limited a court's inquiry into prison management to the question of whether the regimen violates the Constitution. 130
This deference towards institutional administrators has not been limited
to prison officials. In the same year as Bell, the Supreme Court took the
same approach to officials working in mental health facilities. 13 1 Later, in
Youngberg, the Supreme Court extended both prongs of the "hands off" doctrine to conditions in mental health facilities by balancing the patient's freedom from restraint against institutional needs and conferring a presumption
of correctness upon judgments made by medical professionals. 132 Thus, judicial rulings concerning both types of right to treatment cases, those involving
humane conditions in corrections facilities and those involving the quasimedical model, are now limited by the "hands off" doctrine.
III.

WHAT

Is

LEFT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO TREATMENT
DOCTRINE

The majority of opinions in right to treatment cases concerning juvenile
treatment centers were written before 1979. Bell, Rhodes, and Youngberg
were all decided between 1979 and 1983. If those cases had existed at the
time the constitutional right to treatment doctrine was developing, the doctrine would have looked much different. Although children would have been
granted a right to safe conditions, encompassing food, shelter, clothing, and
medical care, the standard used to evaluate those conditions would have
been "mere adequacy." For example, overcrowding would have risen to a
constitutional violation only if it resulted in objectively seriously unsafe conditions. Minimal medical treatment and architecturally suspect facilities
would only violate the Constitution if they created serious health hazards. If
conditions were merely harsh or restrictive, that would have been the price
children would have had to pay for their transgressions.
Children would have had a right to freedom from physical restraints but
only so long as institutional safety was not compromised. Disciplinary sanctions such as isolation might not have been forbidden 33 and corporal punish127. 1& at 547.
128. I& at 548.
129. Id. at 562.
130. Id.

131. See Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 620 (1979) (limiting judicial review of medical decisions made by professionals).
132. Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 324 (1982).
133. See Sandin v.Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293,2301 (1995) (holding that placing adult prisoners
in solitary confinement for disciplinary reasons did not automatically trigger protection under
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ment might have been permitted. 134 Further, when such practices were
evaluated by the courts, the judgments of institutional officials would have
received greater deference. To the extent that their judgments differed with
those of experts or standard-setting groups, they would have been condoned
by the court unless they were completely outside the realm of standard
practices.
Treatment itself might have been viewed differently. If Youngberg was
interpreted to require training in relation to rights possessed inside the institution, the treatment in juvenile training schools would have been limited to
preserving safety and freedom from restraint instead of improving or rehabilitating the child for life in society.' 35 This would be especially true if a court,
either by virtue of its reading of In re Gault or of the purpose clause of the
state statute, believed that community protection was a valid purpose of the
juvenile court. Equally important, the sweeping remedial orders issued in
Morales and in other cases most likely would not have been issued. The
courts would have had to limit their inquiry to discerning constitutional violations and could not enmesh themselves in the minutiae of prison administration. Thus, their orders would not have set treatment and training standards,
personnel ratios, space and occupancy limitations, and other requirements
that are the province of the administrative branch of the government. Indeed, if the cases were brought today, the courts might have had to find that
training school officials had an intent to harm the children or that they at
Due Process Clause); Santana v. Collazo, 714 F.2d 1172, 1181 (1st Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied,
466 U.S. 974 (1984).
134. Only one federal court of appeals has ruled that corporal punishment in prison violates
the Eighth Amendment. See Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir. 1968) (holding that
use of strap is punishment which violates Eighth Amendment). On the other hand, the Supreme
Court has upheld moderate corporal punishment in schools, saying that neither the Eighth nor
the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit it. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977) (holding that paddling of children as means of discipline is not constitutional violation). Indeed, children were subjected to corporal punishment in the British juvenile justice system until quite
recently. See Wallace Mlyniec, Corporal Punishment in the United Kingdom and the United
States: Violation of Human Rights or Legitimate State Action, 8 B.C. INTERNAT'L & COMP. L.
REV. 39, 58-62 (1985) (discussing cases regarding corporal punishment in schools and noting that
British Government announced intention to propose legislation curtailing use of corporal punishment in education system). Further, corporal punishment was specifically listed as a sanction
for children in early state statutes and children were repeatedly subject to corporal punishment
in reformatories and training schools before and after the advent of the juvenile court. See
PLA-r, supra note 7, at 101-02 (discussing provisions for protection and custody of delinquent
children throughout nineteenth century); ROTHMAN, supra note 3, at 279-82 (noting the harsh
punishment to which children were subjected and discussing reasons why dismal conditions existed). On the other hand, the "hog tying" and gratuitous beating of children which came to light
in the litigation would probably be unconstitutional under any standard.
135. Some courts, like that in Alexander S., have not limited Youngberg in this way. See
Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995) (holding that Constitution requires
minimally adequate level of training to provide juveniles with reasonable opportunity to accomplish purpose of confinement). Further, doing so would place the constitutional minimum well
below the requirements of state law. See infra section V for a discussion of the right to rehabilitation and care under state law.
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least showed a deliberate indifference to the children's welfare before the
court could even find a constitutional violation.
Recent right to treatment cases demonstrate the new reticence of federal
courts to rule on these issues. In Santana v. Collazo,1 36 the United States

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed with the district court judge that
the Fourteenth Amendment conferred no right to treatment. 137 The First
Circuit remanded the case only for an inquiry regarding safety and freedom
from physical restraints posed by fire hazards and by isolation as a disciplinary sanction. 138 Further, it upheld a portion of the district court's ruling
that found no constitutional violations even though the conditions in the fa1 39
cilities were "far from ideal."'
In Gary H. v. Hegstrom,140 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit accepted the legal reasoning of the Santana court. The Gary H.
court then required that only minimally adequate training be provided and
that minimal sanitary, health, educational, and medical resources be made
available. 14 1 Further, the provision of services had to be balanced against the
interests and needs of the institution. 42 Moveover, the Ninth Circuit rejected the lower court's imposition of model institution standards that had
been proposed by a professional association, saying that it "is not the duty of
43
the district judge to fashion operating manuals for state institutions.'1
In Hill v. DeKalb Regional Youth Detention Center,144 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the county and the supervisors of a detention center employee who sexually assaulted an inmate
were not liable for damages because the child could not show a "deliberate
indifference" to his medical needs on their part. 145 In In re C.S.,146 the Iowa
Supreme Court reversed a lower court order placing a child in a boys ranch,
even though the supreme court agreed that it was a better placement than
that proposed by the state.' 47 It did so because the United States Constitu148
tion only requires minimally adequate treatment.
136. 714 F.2d 1172 (1st Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 974 (1984).
137. Id. at 1177.
138. Id. at 1183.

139. Id. at 1176. In Santana, prison officials inflicted physical abuse on the juveniles as a
form of punishment. Juveniles were also placed in isolation for several months at a time for
reasons such as having an infectious disease, being epileptic, or being disrespectful to prison
officials. There the juveniles' sole activities were eating and sleeping; they were not allowed to
attend academic or vocational classes and the only reading material made available to them was
the Bible. Id. at 1178.
140. 831 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1987).
141. Id. at 1432.
142. Id. at 1432-33.
143. Id. at 1433.
144. 40 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 1192.
146. 516 N.W.2d 851 (Iowa 1994).
147. Id. at 857.
148. Id. at 860 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 308 (1982)).
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The court in Alexander S. v. Boyd 149 also adopted the legal reasoning of
Santana. The Alexander S. court ruled that children were entitled to treatment that would enable them to correct their behavior. 50 Furthermore, the
court held that children were entitled to basic services such as an adequately
trained staff, minimal levels of programming, and other such services that
would enable the children to achieve their goals.' 5 ' Although the judge
found that this minimal right to treatment had been violated, his order was
modest. 152 Rather than releasing the children or ordering their placements
in other facilities to relieve overcrowding, he ordered the agency to develop a
plan for new facilities; rather than implementing a new disciplinary process,
he merely banned the use of CS gas (tear gas) to control the facility because
it posed an undue risk of bodily harm.' 53 Although cockroach-infested food
and locking devices that posed fire hazards were found to violate the right to
be safe, the court refused to issue remedial orders. 54 Instead, the court55gave
the institution six months to fashion a plan to correct the conditions.
Decisions in recent cases demonstrate the limits of the constitutional
right to treatment doctrine. The Supreme Court's jurisprudence concerning
treatment, prison conditions, and deference to professionals has made trial
courts reluctant to find constitutional violations or to make sweeping remedial orders when such violations are found. If advocates for children seek to
improve the conditions of state training schools and establish sound rehabilitative programs, new legal remedies must be sought.
IV.

EFFECrIVE REHABILITATIVE CARE AND APPROPRIATE PUNISHMENT

(IN THEORY AND IN STATE LAW)

As the constitutional right to treatment withered, rehabilitation lost its
place as the sole purpose of juvenile justice systems in several states.' 56 Legislatures have explicitly endorsed punishment, 157 accountability, 58 and other
149. 876 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1995).
150. Id. at 788.
151. Id. at 788, 790.
152. See id. at 803-04 (stating that principles of federalism required court to allow state to
devise plan to remedy constitutional violations).
153. Id. at 804.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See Feld, supra note 20.

157. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-302(3) (Michie 1987) (authorizing sanctions based on
seriousness of offense); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(e) (West 1984) (defining punishment as
either payment of fine, limitations on minor's liberty, or commitment to local detention or treatment facility); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 39.001(c) (West 1941 & Supp. 1995) (stating that purpose of
statute is partially to ensure protection of society and to provide appropriate control, discipline
and punishment); HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-1 (1988) (stating that statute creates policy and purpose of courts to "render appropriate punishment to offenders"); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN.
§ 13.40.010 (West 1995) (stating that punishment, accountability and treatment are "equally important" purposes); see also In re J.L.A., 643 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 1994) (discussing New Jersey's
Juvenile Code and noting that statute recognizes needs of public safety and provides harsher
penalties).
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principles besides rehabilitation 159 within the juvenile justice system. Some
disposition statutes, which formerly focused almost exclusively on the needs
of the offender, now include mandatory minimum terms of commitment
a60
based solely on the instant offense or the child's record of offenses.
Although these developments represent a dramatic change in the design
of the juvenile justice systems of some states, they do not warrant the conclusion that the provision of rehabilitative care is no longer an essential aspect
of modern juvenile justice. Most state juvenile codes contain express
promises of rehabilitative care. 161 Several state courts have recently reaffirmed the rehabilitative approach to juvenile justice. 162 Additionally, every
juvenile court in the country exercises jurisdiction as parens patriae. For a
century, this doctrine has committed the state to providing delinquent children with substituted parental care. As it has from the beginning, this means
care that will enable children to develop into adults who are capable of meeting their own needs, providing for their families, and contributing positively
to their communities.
Indeed, even states endorsing punishment remain committed to rehabilitation. California, for example, has authorized only "punishment that is con158. See ALA.CODE § 12-15-71 (1975 & Supp. 1994) (placing accountability for children in
hands of parents or children); IDAHO CODE § 16-1801 (1979 & Supp. 1994) (stating that accountability for juvenile offenders is with case managers, families and community); Miss. CODE. ANN.
§ 43-21-103 (1972) (providing that parents of juvenile offenders are primarily responsible for
care, support, education and welfare of children); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-2-2(A) (Michie 1978)
(holding juvenile offenders accountable for their actions); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01(c)
(West 1995) (stating that purpose of statute is to provide treatment, training and rehabilitation
that emphasizes accountability and responsibility of parent and child for child's conduct).
159. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-246(3) (1994) (providing that intent of statute is to reduce
possibility of juvenile offenders committing future crimes)- OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 7001-1.2
(West 1995) (calling for maintaining integrity of substantive law prohibiting certain behavior);
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 51.01(2) (West 1995) (stating that statute should be construed to effectuate purpose of controlling commission of unlawful acts by children). In addition, numerous
statutes recognize the need to protect the public safety. See, e.g., N.D. CENT.CODE § 27-20-01
(1993) (stating that public safety if of utmost concern).
160. See, e.g., ALA.CODE § 12-15-71.1 (1975 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth sentencing guidelines based on degree of offense); see also Feld, supra note 20, at 851-79 (analyzing determinate
and mandatory minimum dispositional statutes).
161. The exact formulation of what is promised varies among some combination of care,
custody, control, guidance, discipline, supervision, treatment, training, and rehabilitation. See
ALA.CODE § 12-15-1.1(7) (1975 & 1994 Supp.) (stating that one of statute's goals is "to provide
a program of supervision, care, and rehabilitation" for delinquent children); OKLA.STAT. ANN.
tit. 10, § 7001-1.2 (West 1995) (stating that goal is to "provide a system for the rehabilitation and
the reintegration of juvenile delinquents into society" and "secure for any juvenile removed
from the custody of his parents the necessary treatment, care, guidance, and discipline to assist
him in becoming a responsible and productive member of society"); R.I. GEN. LAws § 14-1-2(1)
(1994) (stating that purpose of statute is "[t]o secure for each child ... such care, guidance, and
control ... as will serve the child's welfare and the best interest of the state").
162. See Exparte S.F.R., 598 So. 2d 1006, 1008 (Ala. 1992) (refusing to give credit to juvenile offender for previous time in detention based on need to fully rehabilitate youth); In re J.F.,
787 P.2d 364, 365 (Mont. 1990) (holding that juvenile offender needed less restrictive, more
rehabilitative setting, to address alcoholism).
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sistent with the rehabilitative objectives" of its code and has expressly
excluded retribution from the definition of "punishment" within the juvenile
code. 163 Washington's Supreme Court has stated that under the Juvenile Justice Act "the purposes of rendering a child accountable for his acts, punishing
him and exacting retribution from him are tempered by, and in some cases
must give way to, purposes of responding to the needs of the child."' 164 By
making rehabilitation the measure of appropriate punishment, these states
have manifestly reaffirmed a commitment to providing rehabilitative care to
delinquent children even while they seek to achieve other goals as well.
In the District of Columbia, where the juvenile justice code does not
mention punishment, the highest court, in In re L.J., recognized its proper
place, even in a jurisdiction "firmly committed to a rehabilitative approach."'1 65 Describing the role of a modem juvenile court confronting a
frightening level of violence, the court explained that "rehabilitation is not
'166
necessarily synonymous with leniency.'
[A] disposition judge may reasonably conclude that the judicial system can significantly contribute to the rehabilitation of a delinquent
by teaching him that conduct does have consequences and that, so
far as the judge can make them so, the results of antisocial behavior
are predictable. Many, perhaps most, youngsters can respond to a
rational message. If you do well, good things happen to you. If you
commit a little crime, you pay a little price. If you commit a greater
crime, the pain is a little greater. A first offense can be treated leniently, but if you do it again, you are subject to an escalating series of
winces-and you had better believe it because the judge does not
promise severe consequences and then just slap your wrist. That167
is
an approach that a youngster can at least potentially understand.
Relying on settled notions of parens patriae authority rather than a recent legislative endorsement of punishment, this opinion demonstrates that
appropriate punishment, like appropriate care, is inherent in the traditional
conception of the juvenile court. The United States Supreme Court had long
since acknowledged this. In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania,168 the Court referred
repeatedly to a task force report which stated in part, "[w]hat should distin163. CAL_ WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(e). Similarly, Florida does not authorize punishment

for its own sake, but only "punishment that discourages further delinquent behavior." FLA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39.002(4)(b); cf In re J.L.A., 643 A.2d 538, 543 (N.J. 1994) (holding that

punishment was appropriate in light of legislative view of "retributive sentencing goals as legitimate"). Nevertheless, the J.L.A. court went on to assert that rehabilitation "remains a primary
goal of the Juvenile Code," id. at 542, and that a rehabilitated youth should not be confined
solely for purpose of retribution. Id. at 545.
164. State v. Rice, 655 P.2d 1145, 1150 (Wash. 1982). Earlier in its opinion, the court ob-

served that the "legislative directive that the juvenile justice system respond to the needs of the
offender is therefore one of considerable significance." Id.
165.
166.
167.
168.

In re L.J., 546 A.2d 429, 436 (D.C. 1988).
Id. at 438.
id. at 439.
403 U.S. 528 (1976).
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guish the juvenile from the criminal courts 16is9 greater emphasis on rehabilitation, not exclusive preoccupation with it."
The infliction of punishment has coexisted with the promise of rehabilitation for as long as delinquent children have been securely confined. The
belief that confinement ever could be wholly rehabilitative and not at all punitive ignores the experience of the confined children. To them, confinement
is punishment, no matter what a judge, counselor, or correctional officer calls
it, and no matter how helpful or rehabilitative it actually is. Acknowledging
the existence and even inevitability of punishment in juvenile justice does not
render rehabilitation unattainable or dispensable. The challenge today, as
ever, is to insure that meaningful rehabilitation accompanies the inevitable
punishment. The problem is a practical one, not a doctrinal one. States need
are effective
only take advantage of existing knowledge about what programs
170
and provide sufficient funds and facilities for their operation.
Even staunch supporters of rehabilitative programs recognize the usefulness of appropriate sanctions in assisting a delinquent child's development.
Barry Krisberg has written and spoken often of the potential benefits from
programs based on the principle of "graduated sanctions," which he describes
as follows:
A model system of graduated sanctions should combine reasonable,
fair, humane and appropriate penalties with rehabilitative services.
There must be a continuum of care consisting of a variety of diverse
programs. Youths should move between different levels on the continuum based on their behavior. Offenders must understand that
they will be171
subject to more severe sanctions should they continue
to reoffend.
There is an unmistakable similarity between this description and the earlier statement quoted from In re L.J.172 This balance between discipline and
support, and the limited place of punishment in the California and Florida
codes are consistent with accepted notions of child-rearing. As parents may
lawfully impose discipline, so may the state as it seeks to guide delinquent
children in their development into responsible adults. The higher profile
given to punishment and accountability in recent legislation should not divert
attention away from the still-present promise to provide rehabilitative care.
All children must learn discipline and responsibility.
169. Id. at 546 n.6 (quoting PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND CRIME 9 (1967)).

170. For a contrary view of punishment and treatment as "mutually exclusive penal goals,"
supra note 20, at 833.

see Feld,

171. Hearingsbefore the Subcomm. on Crime and CriminalJustice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (testimony of Barry Krisberg); see also JOHN WILSON
& JAMES C. HOwELL, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, COMPRE-

11 (1994)
(discussing that "[r]esearch and experience in intervention and treatment programming suggest
that a highly structured system of graduated sanctions holds significant promise").
HENSIVE STRATEGY FOR SERIOUS, VIOLENT, AND CHRONIC JUVENILE OFFENDERS,

172. See supra notes 166-67 and accompanying text for the language of In re L.J.
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Krisberg demonstrates the necessary interplay between sanctions and
services. 173 The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
reached this same conclusion with respect to the most serious juvenile offenders and the most extreme sanction: confinement. A 1994 report concluded that "secure sanctions are most effective in changing future conduct
when they are coupled with comprehensive treatment and rehabilitation
services. ' 174 Our own observations representing delinquent children for a
175
combined total of thirty years add further support for these conclusions.
Because children pass beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile justice system at a certain age, 176 a state's failure to care properly for the children in its
custody not only harms the children themselves, it undermines the community's interest in safety and order. 177 If children leave the state's care without
having learned how to behave lawfully, deal with conflict, control emotions,
or relate to others, and without the ability to earn a living or to further their
education, they are at grave risk of committing additional offenses, thereby
causing injury to some other person and further reducing their own prospects
for development. 178 The potential harm increases if children leave the state's
care with an oppositional attitude toward authority due to the juvenile justice
system's lack of concern for their well-being.
Statutes and cases from several states recognize this vital interrelationship between the provision of effective rehabilitative services, the imposition
of sanctions, and the protection of the public interest. 79 Maryland offers a
173. See supra note 171 and accompanying text for Krisberg's view on the interplay between sanctions and services.
174. WILSON & HOWELL, supra note 171, at 21; see also David W. Roush, Juvenile Detention Programming,57 FED. PROBATION 20, 24 (1993) ("In most instances, the relationship between helpful programs and punishment is inversely proportional. That is, as helpful program
development expands, the emphasis on and need for punishment decreases.").
175. Nine months on a project assisting children confined in three dysfunctional institutions
amply demonstrated how children struggle with the disciplinary restraints imposed upon them in
the absence of constructive programming. Staff, also frustrated by programming deficiencies,
were unable to engage the residents in a dialogue about how to change their behavior in the
institution or how they would behave after they left. The routine at these facilities degenerated
into a pathetic, yet frightening, game wherein both staff and residents brought out the worst in
each other and the children wound up locked in their rooms for far too much time.
176. The age at which juvenile jurisdiction terminates is typically twenty-one. See, e.g., D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-2303 (1994) (stating that jurisdiction retained until child reaches age of 21).
However, the age may be as low as eighteen. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 8-202(E) (1956 &
Supp. 1994) (stating that juvenile court retains jurisdiction until child reaches age of 18).
177. See Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 780 (D.S.C. 1995) (suggesting correlation
between state's violent crime rate for adults-fifth highest in the nation-and its expenditures
on its juvenile corrections system-seventh lowest in the nation).
178. See Sheryl Brissett-Chapman, Reactions And Solutions, in Symposium, The Unnecessary Detention of Children in the District of Columbia, 3 D.C. L. REV. 425, 425-26 (1995) ("Rehabilitation will not occur and the recidivism rate will not be reduced if the adolescent does not
acquire mastery and competency.").
179. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-302 (1994) (stating that one purpose of Juvenile
Code is "[t]o protect society more effectively by substituting for retributive punishment, whenever possible, methods of offender rehabilitation and rehabilitative restitution"); NEB. REv.
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striking example of the way in which legislators struggle to find language to
synthesize these goals. The statute governing dispositions in delinquency
cases states that "[tihe priorities in making a disposition are the public safety
and a program of treatment, training, and rehabilitation best suited to the
physical, mental and moral welfare of the child consistent with the public
interest. ' 180 The clause begins with "public safety," moves to a comprehensive look at the child's needs, and then turns back to "the public interest."
The importance of meaningful rehabilitative care is not lost amid the legislature's obvious and twice-stated concern for public safety. The Court of Appeals of Maryland has "repeatedly said that the foremost consideration in a
juvenile proceeding after a determination of delinquency is to provide children with a program of treatment and rehabilitation."' 18 1 Just as care can coexist with punishment in a properly functioning juvenile justice system, so
must a concern for public safety be tied to a responsibility to rehabilitate
delinquent children. In fact, public safety cannot likely be maintained unless
children receive the care which they need and which the law promises them.
V.

THE RIGHT TO REHABILITATIVE CARE AND SERVICES
UNDER STATE LAW

The codes of several states contain specific provisions requiring that delinquent children receive the care and services they need. Illinois, for example, guarantees to every child subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court
the "right to services necessary to his or her proper development, including
health, education, and social services."' 82 Similarly, New Hampshire's purSTAT. § 43-246 (1994) (stating that purpose of code is to "reduce the possibility of [juveniles]
committing future law violations through the provision of social and rehabilitative services to
such juveniles and their families").
180. MD. CODE ANN., CTS & JUD. PROC. § 3-820 (1995).
181. In re Keith G., 601 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Md. 1992) (citing In re Patrick A., 540 A.2d 810,
812 (Md. 1988)); see also In re Keith W., 527 A.2d 35, 38 (Md. 1987) (stating that "[a]s we see it,
the overriding goal of Maryland's juvenile statutory scheme is to rehabilitate and treat delinquent juveniles so that they become useful and productive members of society"). For a contrary
ordering of the two priorities, see Thomas R. v. Juvenile Div., Eighth Judicial Dist. Court ex rel.
County of Clark, 664 P.2d 947, 951 (Nev. 1983) (holding that "the primary purpose in delinquency cases is social control; and when one interest must predominate, it should be that of the
public").
182. ILL_ ANN. STAT. ch. 705, para. 405 (Smith-Hurd 1987). Illinois courts have rejected
several appeals which have challenged commitment orders on the ground that they did not address the child's identified needs for care. See In re T.T., Nos. 2-90-1202 to 2-90-1205, 1992 WL
193602 at *8 (Il1. App. Ct. Aug. 13, 1992) (upholding commitment of juvenile offender and trial
court's determination that residential placement would not work); In re G.S., 551 N.E.2d 337,
339 (I11.
App. Ct. 1990) (upholding commitment of juvenile delinquent to Department of Corrections where less secure alternatives were not in best interest of minor or public); In re J.A.G.,
446 N.E.2d 868, 870 (I11.
App. Ct. 1983) (holding that evidence insufficient to show violation of
petitioner's right to treatment), appeal denied, 454 N.E.2d 330 (I1l. 1983). All three rulings were
based, at least in part, on the fact that there was no evidence that the child would not receive the
needed services while committed. See T.T., 1992 WL 193602 at *7 (finding no evidence in record
that juvenile would not receive psychotherapy); J.A.G., 446 N.E.2d at 870 (finding insufficient
evidence to indicate violation of constitutional right to treatment); G.S., 551 N.E.2d at 339 (hold-
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pose clause describes the court's mission of providing "the protection, care,
treatment, counseling, supervision, and rehabilitative resources which [a child
within the court's jurisdiction] needs and has a right to receive, ' 18 3 while
Kentucky's juvenile code states that "[a]ny child brought before the court
under [the juvenile code] shall have a right to treatment reasonably calculated to bring about an improvement in his condition."'184 West Virginia law
spells out the rights of confined juveniles in detail, including the rights to
education, exercise, medical care, nutritious meals, and freedom from physical force and solitary confinement. 185 Florida's delinquency system is
charged with providing substance abuse treatment to children and families
"as resources permit."1 86 A command such as this means that the agency
must exhaust all resources in providing such services. The codes of Arizona
and California provide that delinquent children "shall receive "rehabilitation services"1 87 and "care, treatment, and guidance"' 188 respectively. The
use of the term "right" and the command "shall receive" indicates that these
statutes create rights which may be enforceable in both individual cases and
class-action litigation whenever the states fail to provide appropriate services.
Iowa and Texas both require that before a court can issue certain orders removing a delinquent child from his home, the court must certify that reasonable efforts have been made to prevent the need for removal. 189 One Iowa
court has recognized that "[t]he reasonable efforts requirement provides a
child's attorney a strong tool for enforcing client's [sic] rights to services and
family integrity."' 190 These examples demonstrate that state legislatures have
not forsaken rehabilitation as a goal of the juvenile justice system even as
some have introduced notions of punishment and accountability.' 9 1
Several state courts have ruled that delinquent children committed to
the custody of the state have rights under state law to rehabilitative treating that no evidence presented indicated juvenile would not receive treatment in correctional
institution). The notorious case of two very young Chicago boys convicted of murder has involved the judge in a painstaking effort to determine what the boys need and whether the state's
facilities can provide it. See Gary Marx, Is There Any Real Hope for Young Killers?, CHI. TRIB.,
Jan. 26, 1996, at 1. It is regrettable that it takes such heinous behavior to prompt courts and the
media to spend time finding out whether the juvenile justice system is currently set up to do what
it promises.
183. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:1 (1994).
184. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.10 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1970).

185. W. VA. CODE § 49-5-16a. (1994); see infra notes 197-201 and accompanying text for a
discussion of case law, based on the general purpose of the code, that provides a more general
right to individualized treatment.
186. FLA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 39.002(2) (West 1994).
187. Auz. REV. STAT. ANN. 41-2816 (1995).
188. CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(b) (Deering 1995).
189. IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.52 (West 1995); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(i)(2) (West

1995); contra In re D.M.Y., 892 S.W.2d 792, 796 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that reasonable
efforts requirement applies to neglect cases but not delinquency cases).
190. In re B.L., 491 N.W.2d 789, 793 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992); accord In re M.D.S., 488 N.W.2d
715, 720 (Iowa Ct. App. 1992) (same).
191. See supra note 163 and accompanying text for a discussion of California's recognition
of the legitimacy of punishment.
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ment which will advance their development. Significantly, one of the most
recent of these opinions was issued in Washington, the first state to list punishment as a goal of the juvenile justice system. 192 In State v. S.H.,193 the
Washington Court of Appeals concluded that the purpose clause of the statute imposed a duty upon the state to provide treatment to every child whose
custody was based on a need for treatment.1 94 The court noted that the state
did not even contest the existence of this duty. 195 Finally, the court described
the right, stating that where the length of the disposition imposed was based
on the child's need for treatment, the child "must receive adequate, individualized treatment provided by qualified persons, and the treatment must con1 96
tinue and be beneficial to the juvenile for the length of the disposition.'
The Supreme Court of West Virginia has referred to the existence of a
statutory right to individualized treatment on several occasions. 19 7 This right
extends beyond the entitlements to services specifically listed in the code 1 98
and is based instead on the "rehabilitative goal" announced in the state's
purpose clause. 199 Officials are "required to act in the best interest of the
child and the public in establishing an individualized program of treatment
which is directed toward the needs of the child and likely to result in the
development of the child into a productive member of society. ' 20 0 For as
long as a child is subject to juvenile court jurisdiction, the court must act "to
secure immediately the petitioner's placement in an appropriate juvenile rehabilitation and treatment facility whose program is designed to meet the
'20 1
petitioner's individual needs."
Without expressly articulating a right to rehabilitative care, the Montana
Supreme Court has ruled that under that state's Youth Court Act, a trial
192. See State v. S.H., 877 P.2d 205, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that juvenile offenders have right to rehabilitative treatment under state's Juvenile Justice Act).
193. 877 P.2d 205 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
194. Id. at 216.
195. Id. The state of South Carolina has likewise conceded that it has an "obligation to
develop effective programming for all of the juveniles housed in the state's juvenile justice facilities." Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995). The Alexander S. court did not
state whether the concession was made under state or federal law, but had previously discussed
both sources of the obligation. Id.
196. S.H., 877 P.2d at 216. For a discussion of the limits that the court found to the scope of
this right and judicial review of claims under it, see infra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
197. See State ex rel J.D.W. v. Harris, 319 S.E.2d 815, 822 n.10 (W. Va. 1984) (stating that
"[i]t
is well-settled that a juvenile adjudged delinquent and committed to the custody of the state
has a constitutional and a statutory right to rehabilitation and treatment"); State v. Trent, 289
S.E.2d 166, 175 (W. Va. 1982) (stating that "[w]e think there is little question that a child adjudged delinquent and committed to the custody of the State has both a constitutional and a
statutory right to treatment").
198. See supra note 185 and accompanying text for the entitlements listed in the code.
199. Trent, 289 S.E.2d at 176-77; see also W. VA. CODE 49-1-1 (1994) (stating that "[tihe
purpose of this chapter is to provide a comprehensive system of child welfare ... with recognition of the State's responsibility ...to provide a system for the rehabilitation and detention of
juvenile delinquents").
200. Trent, 289 S.E.2d at 176.
201. Id. at 178.
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court may not order that a delinquent child be placed at a facility which is
incapable of meeting the child's recognized needs. 20 2 In addition, a judge on
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has written in a concurring opinion that the District has an obligation to "adhere to applicable rehabilitative
standards" in caring for the delinquent children in its custody. 20 3 The fact
that the author of this opinion was also the author of the opinion in In re
L.J.2 0 4 provides another example of the inescapable connection between the
imposition of sanctions and the provision of rehabilitative services in an effective juvenile justice system.
Courts regularly invoke the "rehabilitative" nature of the juvenile justice
system as a justification for differential treatment which children (or their
attorneys) perceive as detrimental to their interests, such as the denial of the
right to a jury trial, 20 5 or the possibility of longer confinement than would be
visited upon an adult convicted of the same offense. 20 6 The Washington
Supreme Court rejected a jury demand, notwithstanding the statutory recognition of punishment, based on the court's conclusion that the juvenile justice
system remained rehabilitative. 20 7 Although both the right to a jury trial and
202. In re J.F., 787 P.2d 364, 366 (Mont. 1990). This ruling, like the one in Trent, was based
primarily on the fact that the statute "sets forth the express legislative purpose... as being that
of supervision, care and rehabilitation of the youth-not punishment." Id. at 366. This passage
demonstrates that the purposes which legislatures list in their codes do matter. However, the
Montana statute is not devoted exclusively to youths' needs without regard for the protection of
the community. What the statute seeks to remove from delinquent youths are "the elements of
retribution" which would befall an adult offender. See MorNT. CODE ANN. 41-5-1-2(2) (1993)
(stating that the statute "shall be interpreted and construed to effectuate the following express
legislative purposes: ... to remove from youth committing violations of the law the element of
retribution and to substitute therefore a program of supervision, care, rehabilitation, and in appropriate cases, restitution as ordered by the youth court"). As such, it is typical of modem
juvenile justice statutes, although clearly on the end of the spectrum which places a greater
emphasis on rehabilitative care. For other statutes endorsing punishment but not retribution,
see supra note 157.
203. In re W.L., 603 A.2d 839, 849 (D.C. 1991) (Schwelb, J., concurring). Judge Schwelb's
conclusion was based on a juvenile rule promising "care, custody, and discipline as nearly as
possible equivalent to that which should have been provided for him by his parents," id., the
rehabilitative goals of the Juvenile Code, and local precedent recognizing the right of an individual to " 'a custody that is not inconsistent with the parens patriae premise of the law.'" Id.
(quoting Creek v. Stone, 379 F.2d 106, 111 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
204. 546 A.2d 429, 439 (D.C. 1988).
205. See, e.g., McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 542 (1971) (holding that juvenile
delinquency proceedings do not violate due process even though they deny juvenile right to jury
trial).
206. See, e.g., In re A.M.H., 447 N.W.2d 40, 44 (Neb. 1989) (finding that institutional placement of minors was remedial and not punitive); In re Eric J., 601 P.2d 549, 554-55 (Cal. 1979)
(stating that purpose of adult confinement is punitive and juvenile commitment is remedial).
207. State v. Schaaf, 743 P.2d 240, 250 (Wash. 1987). The court based its ruling that the
system remained rehabilitative on greater flexibility in juvenile proceedings and lesser collateral
consequences of a finding of guilt. Id. This reasoning is suspect because it relies on an enervated understanding of rehabilitation. Withholding adverse consequences merely renders a system more lenient; it does not make it rehabilitative. Reducing the burden of a finding of guilt is
a helpful, but not sufficient, condition for operating a rehabilitative system. Services and support
must be provided before a system can be considered rehabilitative, as that word is commonly
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the right to equal protection are guaranteed by the Federal Constitution,
such rulings reinforce a claim for rehabilitative care under state law. It cannot be, or at least should not be, significant that the system is rehabilitative
when this undermines children's claims, yet insignificant when it bolsters
them. However, judicial reluctance to look behind the legislative declaration
of a rehabilitative purpose and see the reality of children's experiences in
inadequate facilities often thwarts efforts to make the promise a reality.
Although there is no consensus concerning the programs a state should
or must operate to fulfill its obligation of adequate rehabilitative care, 208 it is
universally acknowledged that states must offer education services, both general and vocational. The importance of education to children's development
and their life chances is obvious. All states require children to attend school
up to a certain age. Parents who fail to ensure that their children attend
school may be subject to criminal prosecutions, 20 9 neglect proceedings, 2 10 or
the reduction of welfare benefits. 2 1 1 States exercising parens patriae authority over delinquent children have the same responsibility for ensuring that
the children in their care receive educational services.
The general duty to provide rehabilitative services to children in state
custody necessarily includes the obligation to provide education. 212 Specific
statutory provisions granting general rights to services would necessarily include a right to receive education. Consent decrees governing juvenile justice systems contain specific provisions concerning the education of detained
youth. 2 13 State regulations often also contain standards for the education
which delinquent children in state care are to receive. 214 While education is
understood. Imagine two homes with grave structural problems. The city orders the first to be
demolished with a wrecking ball. The second is allowed to stand for as long as it can. The
housing department would be ridiculed if it claimed that the second home was thereby rehabilitated. As for the greater flexibility or informality of juvenile court proceedings, few significant
differences have survived In re Gault.
208. A tentative consensus is forming around research showing that particular services (e.g.,
family-based therapy and cognitive-behavioral therapy) are more effective at preventing recidivism than some traditional services (e.g., individual and peer-group counseling). Barry Krisberg
et al., What Works With Juvenile Offenders, 10 CRIM. JusTIcE 20, 21-22 (1995).
209. See City of Akron v. Lane, 416 N.E.2d 642, 645 (1979) (upholding conviction of parent
for violating compulsory education law).
210. See In re B.B., 440 N.W.2d 594, 598 (Iowa 1989) (upholding conviction of parent who
provided home schooling for daughter without school district approval).
211. Wis. Admin. Code § HSS 201.195 (Feb. 1995).
212. See Tommy P. v. Board of Comm'rs, 645 P.2d 697, 704 (Wash. 1982) (finding that the
only way to reconcile state's compulsory education law with rehabilitative aspects of Juvenile
Justice Act of 1977 was to read both together as requiring provision of a program of education in
juvenile detention facilities). The court recognized that children in detention are "in urgent need
of education" and concluded by stating that "[w]hile the provision of education in detention may
not be essential to achieve the punishment (accountability) policy of the Act, it is certainly necessary to achieve the rehabilitation ... policy." Id.
213. This is true of consent decrees governing the juvenile justice systems of the District of
Columbia and Arizona.
214. See, e.g., TEx. ADMIN. CODE tit. 37, § 87.31 (requiring all Texas Youth Commission
schools to be accredited by Texas Education Agency).
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not a fundamental right under the Federal Constitution, children in detention
may have claims under the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment if they are denied the education which state law
promises. 2 15 Many state constitutions require the legislature to provide a sys2 16
tem of free schools wherein all the children of the state may be educated.
Some variation from the program provided in the public schools would be
acceptable if necessary to accommodate the state's security or disciplinary
concerns. Deficiencies which cannot be justified by such concerns are illegitimate and should not be tolerated. There are few reported opinions on this
subject, due in part, no doubt, to the fact that few people would claim with a
2 17
straight face that children in state custody should not be educated.
Delinquent children in state care are also entitled to receive special education and related services pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). 218 Under IDEA, all states receiving federal assistance
under the statute are obligated to identify all disabled children (as defined by
the statute) and provide them with a free appropriate public education, including special education and related services. 219 Special education means

specially designed instruction to meet the unique needs of the disabled
child. 220 Related services means "such developmental, corrective, and other
supportive services as are required to assist a child with a disability to benefit
from special education." 22 1 Congress has expressly listed state agencies such
as departments of mental health and welfare and correctional facilities as
215. See Donnell C. v. Illinois State Bd. of Educ., 829 F. Supp. 1016, 1018 (N.D. Ill.
1993)
(holding that school aged pre-trial detainees who alleged denial of adequate education services
stated due process claim).
216. See, e.g., N.Y. CONsT. art. XI, § 1 (providing for "maintenance and support of free
common schools"); N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 4,para. 1 (same).
217. See Tommy P. v. Board of County Comm'rs, 645 P.2d 697, 704 (Wash. 1982) (en banc)
(reconciling education and delinquency laws). Some unreported opinions, along with several of
the major reported pre-Romeo "right to treatment" cases are referred to in MARK I. SOLER ET
AL., REPRESENTING THE CHILD CLIENT 2-63 n.131 (1995).
218. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (1995).
219. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1412(1)(b)-(c) (1995). One meta-analysis of studies concerning the
number of children in the juvenile justice system who would be classified as disabled within the
meaning of IDEA has estimated that 12.6% of juvenile offenders are mentally retarded, and
35.6% have learning disabilities. Pamela Casey & Ingo Keilitz, Estimating the Prevalence of
Learning Disabled and Mentally Retarded Juvenile Offenders: A Meta-Analysis, in UNDERSTANDING TROUBLED AND TROUBLING YouTH 82, 89, 93 (Peter Leone ed., 1990). There were
not enough studies under review in this meta-analysis concerning emotionally disturbed youth to
enable the authors to estimate the prevalence of this disability among juvenile delinquents. Id.
at 85. Professor Peter Leone has stated that 30-50% of all children in confinement have been
enrolled in special education prior to their detention. Professor Peter Leone, Address at District
of Columbia School of Law and the Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Foundation Symposium (June
24, 1995).
220. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1401(a)(16) (1995).
221. 34 C.F.R. § 300.16 (1994). The list of related services found here is not intended to be
exhaustive but is still quite lengthy. It covers virtually all aspects of a child's life and is a potent
weapon for advocates on behalf of children with disabilities in or out of the juvenile justice
system.
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within the statute's scope.2 2 2 Juvenile justice systems in any state receiving
federal funds under IDEA must identify disabled children in their care,
promptly devise an appropriate plan for them, and provide the necessary
services. Studies and litigation from across the country have revealed grave
223
deficiencies in all of these areas.
The cases and statutes discussed in this section demonstrate that delinquent children have rights to rehabilitative care based on state law. These
rights are distinct from any constitutional claim and retain their force even
within a system which avowedly punishes youths. This right includes the
right to receive adequate education services, but goes much further, reaching
all types of care necessary to fulfill the states' promise of rehabilitation, training, and substituted parental care.
VI. THE

INADEQUACY OF CARE AND SERVICES TODAY

Despite the clear command of the statutes and cases discussed above,
children in juvenile justice systems across this country do not receive services
which are even minimally adequate to meet their needs. 224 As discussed earlier, education is the one service which every child will certainly need while in
state care. Professor Peter Leone, an education professional with experience
in many juvenile justice systems, recently related that a detention center in
Kentucky he visited last year offered an educational program which consisted
of one-and-a-half to two hours a day of instruction by a single teacher who
was not affiliated with any educational authority. 225 This sad reality belied
the law of that state, which promises delinquent children a "right to treatment reasonably calculated to bring about an improvement in [their] condition."' 22 6 A similar situation exists in detention centers throughout Georgia,
where a single teacher attempts to educate a population of fifty youths ranging in age from ten to seventeen. The extent of the damage caused by such
222. 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b) (1995). The Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice
submitted a Statement of Interest in the Alexander S. litigation expressing the opinion of the
United States Department of Education that the obligations of IDEA clearly apply to all juvenile facilities, including short-term detention facilities. Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773,
802 (D.S.C. 1995). Statement of Interest on file with author.
223. See, e.g., Peter E. Leone, Education Services for Youth with Disabilitiesin an StateOperated Juvenile CorrectionalSystem" Case Study and Analysis, 28 J. SPECIAL EDUC. 43, 56
(1994) (stating that "'turf protection' and an unwillingness to challenge practices in other state
agencies result in less-than-adequate monitoring and support for special education in correctional facilities").
224. This discussion necessarily relies on anecdotal evidence. A systematic review of the
needs of confined juveniles and the availability and effectiveness of programs to meet them has
not yet been done. See generally DALE PARENT ET AL., CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT: JUVENILE DETENTION AND CORRECTIONS FACILITIES (1994) (calling for such review).
225. Conversation with Professor Peter Leone, Department of Special Education, University of Maryland.
226. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 600.010 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill 1970). This dire situation also
violated state regulations which require that education programs in detention centers be
"designed to assist detained juveniles in keeping up with their studies." 500 Ky. ADMIN. REGS.
§ 6:150 (1987).
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an inappropriate program is immense: hundreds of youths pass through
22 7
these facilities every year, with the average stay lasting eight months.
There can be no doubt that rather than providing an opportunity to make up
lost ground, these facilities cause the skills the youths bring with them to
deteriorate. A site visit by representatives of the Justice Department to a
facility in Wayne County, Michigan revealed that "twenty-one percent of the
population were out of school the entire day, either watching television, sitting silently, or locked in their rooms. '228 One student had been excluded
from school for two weeks for wearing his hair in dreadlocks. 229 There is
little doubt that a parent so negligent in looking after a child's education
230
would face sanctions from at least one court, if not two or three.
Regrettably, wholesale child neglect by states often proves resistant to
even the strongest efforts at reform. The District of Columbia juvenile justice system operates under a consent decree entered in 1986.231 The decree
is comprehensive, specifying population and staffing levels, imposing a deadline for individual assessments of children's needs, setting standards for education, medical care, recreation services and other programs, and most
ambitiously, calling for the creation of a continuum of care centered around
the greatly expanded use of community-based programs and facilities. The
judge presiding over the case issued his first order to force compliance with
the terms of the decree a year after it was entered. The judge captioned this
first order, which called for the creation of specific vocational programs for
committed youths, "Memorandum Order A." The judge left the case in 1994
when he was appointed to a seat on the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia. By the time he did so, he had issued his eighteenth
compliance order, "Memorandum Order R."1232 Along the way from A to R,
227. Mark Silk, Stopping Juvenile Crime DCYS needs 'more of everything,' ATLANTA CONSTITUTION, Sept. 23, 1994, at D5. In May 1995, one of these facilities added sixty residents and
the one full-time teacher had two part-time teachers assisting. Mark Silk, Youth's Suicide Highlights Problems at DeKalb Facility, ATLANTA CONsTrIuTION, May 9, 1995, at C4.

228. DETROr FREE PREss, Dec. 23, 1994, at lB. The extent to which state facilities operate
outside the law is frightening. The state social services agency refused to certify the Wayne
County facility as suitable for the care of children. If it were a private facility, workers said, it
would surely be shut down. DE-rRoIT FREE PRESS, Mar. 2, 1994, at lA.
229. Id.
230. Mental health services may be almost as critical as education to caring for children in
confinement, yet an editorial in the July 3, 1991, Seattle Times reported that the "superintendent
of Green Hill School noted that for much of the past year only one psychologist served the entire
statewide system." Task Force Study-Treatment is Lacking in State Juvenile System, SEATTLE
TIMES, July 3, 1991, at A6. Although a successful rehabilitation program need not rely on heavy
doses of psychological counseling, the experience of confinement in dysfunctional institutions
can be so traumatic that the services of a psychologist will frequently be needed. See PARENT ET
AL., supra note 224 (listing suicide prevention as one of the areas most in need of improvement
in juvenile facilities nationwide).
231. Jerry M. v. District of Columbia, C.A. No. 1519-95 (IFP) (consent decree entered July
24, 1986).
232. The judge who assumed jurisdiction over the case has taken to captioning his orders
with numbers. Thus, the District will be spared the embarrassment of receiving Memorandum
Order Z.
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the judge visited and revisited issues of population levels, certification of
teachers, suicide prevention, medical care, and the continued failure of the
city to develop the continuum of care promised at the very beginning. The
following quote from Memorandum Order H suggests that even judicial supervision often will be insufficient to move a juvenile justice system into conformity with recognized standards: "Defendants have, since the inception of
the Consent Decree, responded to deficiencies in medical care only when
pressure was brought to bear from without. When there was no outside
threat, defendants have given every indication that they were satisfied with a
'233
clearly substandard and ineffective system of medical care.
While sustained improvement in medical care services followed the issuance of Order H, 234 little progress has yet been made in terms of establishing
the continuum of care or improving the educational and vocational programs
in or out of the District's juvenile facilities. 235 Frustrated with continued
non-compliance, the court warned that it would not "stand idly by while the
legal fiction upon which the system is premised-parens patriae-degenerates into both tragedy and farce. '236 The court has not merely threatened
city officials in the effort to get them to meet their obligations toward the
children in their care; it has imposed staggering monetary sanctions 237 and
appointed Special Masters for specific issues.2 38 Nevertheless, the system is
an abject failure. 239 Instead of devoting resources to the design and implementation of an effective system centered on community-based programs,
city leaders have shuffled papers and personnel within the flawed traditional
structure. The result is that the city has provided few services to any of its
delinquent children, those confined or those nominally supervised in the
community. This repeated failure has been compounded by the exceptional

233. Memorandum Order H, Sept. 28, 1989, at 2. In Memorandum Order I, the court reviewed the city's compliance with the teacher staffing provisions of the decree. The consent
decree called for compliance by September, 1987. The evidence before the court showed that
the city did not seek permission to hire until February, 1990. Once again, the judge concluded,
this recent hiring, with the treat of contempt imminent, showed that "defendants act swiftest
when subject to external pressure."
234. See Memorandum Order L.
235. A panel of experts reported to the court that "[c]ompliance is so low on the city's
agenda that [the continuum of care] will never be implemented by YSA (the Youth Services
Administration) and needed educational and vocational services will never be provided by
DCPS (the District of Columbia Public Schools)." Memorandum Order J, Aug. 21, 1991 (quoting Report of Aug. 1990).
236. Order J, at 65.
237. Id. at 69.
238. Order J, Order L.
239. For a discussion of a much more successful experience with litigation-driven reform in
a juvenile justice system, see Dale Sanniti, Litigation as an Instrument for Change in Juvenile
Detention: A Case Study, 39 CRIME AND DELINQ. 1 (1993).
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expenses it has
brought on in the form of contempt fines and plaintiffs' law0

24
yers' fees.

The District of Columbia is not unique in this regard. Other juridsictions have experienced the same problems, with the same causes. 24 1 Three
years ago, the presiding judge of the Juvenile Division of the Superior Court
of Maricopa County, Arizona, wrote that "[t]he major crisis in the juvenile
justice system in Arizona today, at both the state and county levels, is the
inability to provide appropriate treatment and rehabilitative services to the
juveniles and families in the system. ' 242 The judge traced this inability to the
lack of resources allocated to the system, a problem which was getting worse
as time passed. Rather than money, the state legislature was addressing the
problem with nomenclature. In 1990, responsibility for juvenile justice programs was taken from the Dpartment of Corrections and given to a newlycreated Department of Juvenile Corrections. In 1991, the name of the new
department was changed to the Department of Youth Treatment and Rehabilitation, "presumably as a symbolic reaffirmation of the treatment and rehabilitative focus of the juvenile justice system. '24 3 With the new name came
a budget cut and a further deterioration of services.244 In 1993, litigation
involving one Arizona facility resulted in a consent decree. 245 According to
the plaintiff's lead attorney, the education and special education services at
the facility have vastly improved since the decree was entered. 246 These improvements may soon be meaningless, as Arizona's governor has vowed to
abolish the juvenile justice system entirely, diverting minor offenses to neighborhood resolution centers and prosecuting all other child offenders as adults
247
in criminal court.
240. Memorandum Order J,at 20. The Memorandum stated: "the biggest impediment to
compliance . . .is the city's refusal to allocate adequate fiscal and human resources for the
continuum of services ordered by the court." Id.
241. See, e.g., In re C.C., 878 P.2d 865, 869 (Kan. Ct. App. 1994) (questioning whether
agency's placement procedure serves children's interests, while recognizing that dubious procedure "has inevitably arisen because insufficient funding and inadequate space" have limited
agency's ability to provide needed care); In re Daniel West, 427 S.E.2d 889, 892 (N.C. Ct. App.
1993) (affirming trial court's order even though trial court stated that funding and programming
limitations left it unable to issue a dispositional order which satisfied statutory command because

it could not meet needs of child or interest of community).
242. James E. McDougall, Crisisin the Juvenile Justice System, ARIz. AroRNFY, Oct. 1992,

at 23.
243. Id. at 25.
244. Id.
245. See David Lambert, Johnson v. Upchurch Victory Brings Bid Reforms in Arizona Juvenile Institutions, XIV Youmr LAW NEWS 1 (1993).

246. Conversation with David Lambert, National Center for Youth Law (July 1995). Mr.
Lambert attributed the educational improvements in part to the decision of the legislature to
create a unitary school district to administer education programming at all juvenile facilities.
247. See Pat Flannery, Governor: Let Voters Reform Youth Justice, PHOENIX GAZE"rrE,

Apr. 19, 1995, at B1. The governor had first made the call for abolition in his January 1995 State
of the State address. The article cited here described his renewed call, made at a ceremony
signing a bill changing the name of the Department of Youth Treatment and Rehabilitation back

to the Department of Juvenile Corrections.
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At the time the lawsuit was filed in Alexander S. v. Boyd,248 South Carolina offered very few programs other than educational programs. The Alexander S. court remarked that "unsuccessful efforts at rehabilitation stem
primarily, if not exclusively, from the lack of adequate funding to devise and
implement programs that will allow juveniles to correct their behavior while
they are at DJJ facilities. ' 249 The court went on to say that "[w]ithout minimally adequate programming, the agency is simply warehousing the juveniles
and ignoring the statutory purpose of their confinement. '2 50 The court
seemed pleased to note that the state had introduced several new programs
in response to the litigation and that preliminary data indicated that the
youths in those programs behaved better in the institution and had greater
success in the community than those who were not in the programs. 25 1 These
results demonstrate that meaningful progress can be made while children are
in state care. It is absurd that litigation is required to stimulate a response,
and it is lamentable that this institutional child neglect is so widespread, and,
in many places, so resistant to any efforts to remedy it.
VII.

THE ROLE OF COURTS IN ENSURING THAT CHILDREN RECEIVE
EFFECTIVE CARE AND SERVICES

For more than twenty years, at least since Kent v. United States252 and In
re Gault,253 courts from across the country have voiced frustration with the
inadequacy of the rehabilitative programs offered by the juvenile justice system, which renders dispositional orders in individual delinquency cases little
more than wishful thinking.2 54 Trial court judges feel this frustration most
acutely. One has written that "[o]ne of the most frustrating experiences for
me, as a judge, is to have my hands tied; that is to be unable to take the
appropriate action in a particular case, whether it is due to state law, lack of
funds, or simply lack of the necessary program. '255 Another judge, chafing
at the paucity of rehabilitative options offered by the state agency but restrained by local precedent from ordering an alternative, refused to certify, as
required by statute, that the disposition ultimately ordered would serve
either the public interest or the needs of the child. 25 6 The Illinois judge presiding over the cases of the twelve- and thirteen-year-old boys convicted of
the murder of a five-year-old reluctantly ordered the boys to youth prison
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.

876 F. Supp. 773 (D.S.C. 1995).
Id. at 781.
Id. at 790.
Id.
383 U.S. 541 (1966).
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
See, e.g., In re Welfare of J.E.C., 225 N.W.2d 245, 250 (Minn. 1975) (remanding case

for further fact-finding concerning agency's decision to operate no programs designed for hardcore, sophisticated, and aggressive delinquents).
255. Judge Paul R. Davis, The Balanced Approach for Juvenile Justice: A Challengefrom
the Bench, in JUVENILE PROBATION: THE BALANCED APPROACH 51 (Dennis Maloney et al.
eds., 1988).
256. In re Daniel West, 427 S.E.2d 889, 892 (N.C. Ct. App. 1993).
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but scheduled an extraordinary post-disposition hearing at which the state
must present its plan for meeting the boys' needs.2 57 Experience in the District of Columbia has provided countless examples of judges straining to
guide the care of delinquent children despite statutory limitations on their
authority to do so. Under local law, judges can forbid the agency from releasing a committed child without court approval,2 58 but they lack authority
to direct the day-to-day program of a committed child.2 5 9 Many judges
schedule review hearings in which they assess the performance of both the
child and the agency during the commitment before deciding whether to authorize the child's release. Actually, judges do much more than simply assess. Sometimes, they issue orders of dubious legality, and other times, they
merely apply the pressure of their displeasure, in the hope of prompting effective care and supervision for the child.
Allowing courts to engage in meaningful post-disposition review of
agency care would provide a useful, albeit quite limited, check on administrative discretion. Several states provide that the juvenile court's continuing jurisdiction over delinquency cases authorizes it to continue to play a role in
the decisions as to what is done for the child.2 60 The cases and statutes surveyed reveal great differences in the scope of a court's post-commitment authority. The West Virginia Supreme Court in Trent appears to suggest that
the court can, in appropriate circumstances, revisit the case as if it were back
at the original disposition hearing. 261 Cases in Montana and Alaska suggest
that the court should review the agency's program for the child under an
abuse of discretion standard, approving any reasonable professional decision.2 62 The Montana statute authorizes the court to "revoke or modify" a
257. Gary Marx, Kid Killers Ordered to Prison, Cm. TRIB., Jan. 30, 1996, at 1.
258. See D.C. CODE § 24-805 (1985) (providing youth offender an appeal from a finding of
the Director of Corrections that youth will derive no further benefit from treatment).
259. See In re J.J., 431 A.2d 587, 591 (D.C. 1981) (stating that agency has exclusive supervi-

sory responsibility for juvenile and court relinquishes authority to determine appropriate rehabilitative measures once it transfers custody to agency).
260. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.080(0 (1995) (stating that court may frequently review
all placement orders to determine best interests of minor and public); MONT. CODE ANN. § 41-5523(4) to (5) (1993) (providing courts with authority to order medical and psychological evalua-

tions and authority to determine financial ability of youth's parents to pay for evaluations); W.
VA. CODE § 49-5-2 (1995) (discussing requirements for continuing jurisdiction of court in juvenile cases); In re B.S.M., 767 P.2d 319, 320 (Mont. 1989) (holding that court is responsible for
choosing disposition alternatives); State v. Trent, 289 S.E.2d 166, 177 (W. Va. 1982) (stating that
court is required to review child's history to determine appropriate treatment plan); State v.
S.H., 877 P.2d 205, 216 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (relying on treatment recommendations when
considering disposition); cf. In re J.A.G., 443 A.2d 13, 24 (D.C. 1982) (holding that District of
Columbia juvenile court lacks authority to intervene after issuing order committing custody of
delinquent child to Department of Human Services); In re J.M.W., 411 A.2d 345, 349 (D.C.

1980) (same).
261. See Trent, 289 S.E.2d at 174 (stating that court may retain custody of juvenile if director of facility determines rehabilitation impossible).

262. See B.S.M., 767 P.2d at 320 (stating that because decision of placement rests with Department of Health and Social Services, court reviews decision only for abuse of discretion);
Department of Health & Social Servs. v. A.C., 682 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984)
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commitment order where appropriate. 263 It is not clear what power an
Alaska court can exercise if it determines that the agency has abused its discretion in its efforts to care for the child. The Washington Court of Appeals
has called for extremely deferential review, directing courts to deny a child's
or the record makes
petition without a hearing unless the agency concedes,264
clear, that no meaningful treatment is being provided.
The Washington Court of Appeals expressed concern that any less deferential standard would result in judges "micro-managing" the agency. 265 This
concern is a very real one, as described below, but such severe restrictions on
judicial review render children's rights to rehabilitative services meaningless
in all but the most egregious cases. Such cavalier disregard for the needs and
rights of the many children in confinement who receive care barely distinguishable from total neglect-yet far short of the substituted parental care
that the law promises-is not required by any limitations on the role of
courts. The abuse of discretion standard announced by the Alaska Court of
Appeals in Department of Health & Social Services v. A. C.266 preserves respect for agency prerogative and expertise without placing all but the most
grotesque misfeasance beyond judicial scrutiny. This deferential standard
would not likely result in courts upsetting agency decisions in very many instances. Legitimate administrative judgments would be respected. However,
the very prospect of the review hearing provides a powerful incentive for the
agency to consider whether it is meeting its obligation to the child. The need
to justify the program to an official outside the agency forces agency administrators to examine their position from the perspective of someone who is not
indoctrinated with the agency's own imperatives and protocols. In a recent
article addressing the similar overlap of authority between judges and administrative agencies in child abuse and neglect cases, Bruce Boyer proposed a
prudential rule for courts to apply in deciding when to defer to agency discretion and when to exercise jurisdiction. 267 Such a standard would create a far
more active role for courts in deciding what care a child receives.
The scope of judicial authority to monitor or direct the rehabilitative
care of a child can have considerable importance in particular cases. Regularly faced with the herculean task of moving an unresponsive bureaucracy,
Boyer suggests a system where a lawyer need only persuade one decisionmaker, the judge, about the needs of one child, the client, in one case, the
(stating that court will "not second guess ... professional treatment decisions" absent a showing
of clearly inadequate treatment).
263. MoNT. CODE ANN. § 41-5-523(5).
264. S.H., 877 P.2d at 216.
265. Id.
266. 682 P.2d 1131, 1134 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984).
267. See Bruce Boyer, JurisdictionalConflicts Between Juvenile Courts and Child Welfare
Agencies: The Uneasy Relationship Between Institutional Co-Parents, 54 MD. L. REV. 377, 426
(1995) (suggesting three issues germane to court's decision to preempt administrative agencies:
(1) nature of interest at stake and does dispute compel court to safeguard that interest; (2) harm
to child if planned action goes forward; and (3) preclusion of review if court fails to review
agency's planned decision).
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one before the court. On any given day, before a judge with the authority to
order the provision of specific services, a lawyer can hope to bring about
meaningful change in the life of that client. 268 However, giving individual
judges the authority to order services in individual cases cannot increase the
agency's ability to provide appropriate care to all of its children. In many
respects, this is a zero-sum game, wherein the substance abuse treatment slot
given by judicial fiat to the first child through the door in Courtroom 1 is not
available to any other children in that courtroom or in any other courtroom
that day, regardless of which one has the most urgent need. Judges reviewing
particular cases cannot create more slots. Meaningful judicial review, such as
that suggested by Boyer, or the A. C. court, can, however, make sure that the
agency is in fact exhausting all available appropriate resources in every individual case. 2 69 A likely side benefit of such a system would be that legislators
would get accurate feedback concerning the levels at which they are funding
rehabilitative programs. Agency representatives who are forced to explain to
judges why they cannot provide obviously needed services will have an incentive to report their difficulties to their supervisors, who will be prompted in
turn to let legislators know that they need the money to satisfy the judiciary's
daily demands.
VIII.

LOOKING FOR HOPE IN RELATIONSHIPS RATHER THAN WORDS

Despite a century of legislation, years of litigation, and daily representation by lawyers in individual cases, delinquent children in state custody
throughout the country do not receive the care and assistance needed to enable them to develop into competent, law-abiding, contributing members of
their communities. In light of this history and the clamor of contemporary
politicians battling furiously to prove themselves the toughest on children
who have broken the law, it seems almost futile to issue a call for more effective programming for such children. Nevertheless, current research and new
program models not only compel us to make such a call, they point the way
to a more convincing understanding of the relationships among delinquent
children, their families, juvenile courts, and communities. This new understanding moves beyond the Progressive juvenile court of the 1890s as well as
the "just desserts" model of recent years.
The Progressive notion that children could be removed from their
homes, improved under the benevolent eye of the parens patriae juvenile
court, and set free to live out their days in peace and happiness was hopelessly simplistic. Its fatal flaw was not its assumption that children who have
misbehaved could be directed toward better behavior. Current research discussed below validates that belief. What makes the Progressive model unten268. In addition to providing for meaningful review, states could fortify courts' ability to

make sure that agencies meet their obligations to children in state care by specifying in the
disposition statute some of the services which should be generally available and giving courts the

authority to order those services where appropriate.
269. See Boyer, supra note 267, at 426 (discussing judicial review).
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able today is its focus on the child, as the subject of the court's care, without
adequate regard for the complexity of the child's relationship to his family
and the place of the child and the family within the community. Children are
born into and raised by families-particular families-and those families live
in communities, which offer a mixture of danger and opportunity to all members. Society's response to a child's delinquency must address the fact that,
even if removed, the child will return to his family and community. The exercise of juvenile court jurisdiction must recognize these bonds and draw on the
strengths and compensate for the weaknesses within families and
communities.
A juvenile court cannot hope to solve such a complicated problem by
the application of "treatment," like a doctor prescribing pills. Continued usage of the term "treatment," which was initiated by the Progressives and relied on by the modern juvenile justice reformers, can only generate
confusion. The Progressives employed the term as an analogy: courts were
expected to respond to delinquency just as doctors respond to illness: by
identifying and treating the cause. In the heyday of constitutional juvenile
justice reform, some advocates referred to treatment as a methodology: children's behavior was to be corrected via psychotherapeutic care. 270 Neither
usage can be supported today. It is extremely difficult to identify a specific
cause for any particular child's delinquent behavior. Experts have achieved a
near-consensus that individual psychotherapy is ineffective with many delinquent children. 271 Certainly, such care should be provided to those children
who need it. However, the states have an obligation to provide care for all
their delinquent children, and little of the care needed would qualify as
"treatment" within a medical model. All children can be taught how to handle difficult situations, relate with other people, and exercise good judgment.
They all can increase their fund of knowledge, develop learning skills, and
cultivate vocational aptitudes. These are the specific skills which parents are
responsible for facilitating while children are in their care. They are the concrete skills which, at a minimum, the juvenile justice system, in its parens
patriaerole, must ultimately provide for children in state care. While this list
justice
is somewhat prosaic, it would be a considerable advance if the juvenile
272
system began to make widespread progress in any of these areas.
270. Much of the right to treatment litigation addressed many other issues, as discussed in
the earlier parts of this article. Moreover, plaintiff's attorneys were wise to phrase their claims
in terms which were taken from the history of the juvenile court and the purpose clauses of the
existing statutes. However, given the dubious validity or the limited scope of a constitutional

right to treatment today, advocates for children gain little by continuing to employ this outmoded term.
271. Joy DRYIFoos, ADOLESCENTS AT RISK 145 (1990) ("Earlier delinquency prevention
efforts expected that individual psychotherapy would 'cure' delinquents of criminal tendencies.

This did not prove to be the case.").
272. The designers of the Balanced Approach, a relatively new concept in juvenile justice
system design, have also forsaken the term "treatment." They emphasize "competency-building" as one of the system's essential goals. They define competency as "the capacity to do something well that others value" and list work, cognitive skills, decision-making abilities, service, and
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Not only is "treatment" inaccurate as a description of what juvenile
courts can or should do, the medical model - whether analogy or method is incompatible with the harshest modem juvenile justice legislation. Several
states have recently introduced the concept of mandatory minimum terms of
confinement into the juvenile justice system. 273 Such a procrustean rule is
totally inconsistent with the medical model. Under a medical model, once
the condition causing the child to offend has been identified and removed,
further confinement is unwise and unjustified. A doctor would never suggest,
let alone insist, that a patient continue a course of medication beyond the
time when the infection has been conclusively treated. The skills discussed
above are skills which states can and should develop throughout a child's
term of confinement or supervision, whatever its duration. 27 4
The call for abandoning the term "treatment" should not be interpreted
as a rejection of the traditional juvenile court mission of providing care which
aids delinquent children in growing up to be more capable of controlling
their own behavior, caring for others, and contributing to their community.
To the contrary, we seek to open the field wider to those programs which are
currently achieving measurable success in attaining these goals in the face of
the conventional wisdom that "nothing works. '275 While traditional individual and peer-group counseling have not had much effect on helping children
to change their behavior, 276 several other programs have produced beneficial

results. The most promising programs are those which are family-oriented
learning as important competencies which the juvenile justice system should help children develop. Training materials and background research provided by the project designers are on file
with the authors. This approach is noted with strong approval in Minnesota Supreme Court
Advisory Task Force on the Juvenile Justice System: Final Report, 20 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 595
(1994). The Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention has called this project a
"promising paradigm of juvenile justice." OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINOUENCY
PREVENTION, BALANCED AND RESTORATIVE JUSTICE: PROGRAM SUMMARY

(1994).

273. ALA. CODE § 12-15-71.1 (1975 & Supp. 1994); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-3-113 to 19-3115. The Alabama Supreme Court has very recently stated that its juvenile code is "not punitive
but rehabilitative." Ex parte S.F.R., 598 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Ala. 1992). Many legislatures have
recently expanded the states' authority to prosecute children in criminal court. This removes
those children from the rehabilitative care promised in the juvenile justice system. However the
juvenile justice system is conceived, it will not reach children subject to criminal prosecution,
except to the extent that as juvenile justice systems become more effective, judges and prosecutors will use their discretion to channel more cases to the juvenile justice system.
274. The authors of this article do not endorse mandatory minimum terms of commitment.
We strongly believe that children should neither be confined nor supervised beyond the period
where they pose a danger to the community. Nevertheless, mandatory minimums are an important recent development in juvenile justice, and any attempt to describe the current system must
acknowledge their existence.
275. Doubts about the effectiveness of rehabilitative programs were prominently raised in
1974. See Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, in
THE PUBLIC INTEREST (1974). This and other research questioning the effectiveness of rehabilitative efforts are discussed in BARRY FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN 268-69 (1993).
276. Barry Krisberg et al., What Works with Juvenile Offenders, 10 CrIM. JUST. 60 (1995).
This same conclusion is also reached in a thorough review of research data prepared this year.
RICHARD A. MENDEL, AMERICAN YOUTH POLICY FORUM, PREVENTION OR PORK? A HARDHEADED LOOK AT YOUTH-ORIENTED ANTI-CRIME PROGRAMS 22-23 (1995).
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and address communication and problem-solving skills of the children and
other family members. Such programs "have demonstrated strong and lasting positive effects" 277 which have been summarized as follows by the Office
of Technology Assessment:
Several studies have shown that, in the short term, family systems
approaches cut recidivism rates by half in comparison with more
traditional forms of psychotherapy... and no-treatment groups and
on child and family functioning than other
have a greater impact
2 78
types of therapy.
A second class of successful programs emphasizes cognitive and behavioral
skills. These programs differ from traditional individual and group counseling in that they focus the counselor and the child on specific social skills such
as self-control, moral reasoning, and problem-solving. Again, their success
has been demonstrated by changed behavior patterns for those children who
2 79
receive such services.

These programs are likely to be much more effective than boot camps
and other programs which are based on the notion that offenders can be
"shocked" into changing their behavior. 280 If the prospect of negative consequences for failure was enough to change delinquent children's behavior, we
would expect to see greatly reduced recidivism among those who have been
confined. What is missing from these negative-reinforcement strategies is
sufficient opportunity for youths to develop the skills that they will need in
the settings where they eventually will live (i.e., family, school, community,
work place) and where they will have to make the difficult decisions that will
take them away from the troubles of their past. Unless steps are taken to
help youths translate the discipline and aptitudes learned at boot camp into
their homes and neighborhoods, the drills will be no more than wasted sweating and shouting.
Even the District of Columbia, the site of the protracted failure of juvenile justice reform described above, has been the site of promising innovation
of late. At long last, a model of community-based programming has begun,
under the auspices of the Children's Trust Neighborhood Initiative. This organization enlists children and their families in "family life management
planning" which is distinguished from traditional case planning in that "it
takes an all-encompassing view of providing support, services, and resources
that address the needs of the high-risk youth, their family, household mem277. MENDEL, supra note 276, at 20.

278. Id. at 20 (quoting Office of Technology Assesment). See also Albert R. Roberts &
Michael J. Camasso, The Effect of Juvenile Offender Treatment Programson Recidivism: A Metaanalysis of 46 Studies, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmICS & PUB. POL'Y 421 (1991).
279. MENDEL, supra note 276, at 21; Krisberg et al., supra note 276, at 58.
280. Recent studies have found that promising strategies exist even for children who have
been involved in serious misconduct or have been offending over a period of years. See OFFICE
OF JUVENILE JUSTICE DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, supra note 272, at n.145; Charles M.
Borduin, Innovative Models of Treatment and Delivery in the Juvenile Justice System, 23 J.
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 19, 54 (1994); J.A. Fagan, Treatment and reintegration of violent juvenile
offenders: Experimental results, JUST. Q. 7, 233-63 (1990).
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bers, and significant peers, in their homes, schools, and communities. ' 28 1 It
did not take any new legislation to bring this program about. What it took,
regrettably, was years of fines for non-compliance with court orders, and the
hand of a court-appointed monitor to direct the money to people who were
not wedded to the old treatment paradigm nor the new punishment craze.
All people concerned with meaningful change in the lives of delinquent children should take advantage of this gathering momentum in the social sciences and try to break through the barriers which contemporary politics and
media practices have erected between communities and the information
about successful rehabilitative programs.
The misallocation of resources into more restrictive confinement instead
of more effective institutional and community-based programs results from
more than a simple misunderstanding about whether or not such programs
work. In many communities, too many people have given up on the notion
that offenders, both juvenile and adult, can be and should be reintegrated
into the larger community. Too many people reject any connection with the
young men and women involved in the juvenile justice system and see the
world as divided between offenders (and potential offenders) and victims
(and potential victims). The first group, it is widely thought, must be put in
secure facilities to assure the safety of the second. 282 This desire to remain
apart from offenders carries over into a desire to remain apart from the system, to learn how it works, to see how it fails, to see where it wastes the
community's financial and human resources. The result is an over-reliance
on costly, large, secure institutions which have been proven to be no more
effective in terms of public safety than less expensive, smaller, communitybased programs. Feeling no investment in the system, citizens will not commit the time to learn about how it might work better nor will they allow the
283
expenditure of money to enable effective programs to succeed.
In part, this alienation may be attributable to the failure of the system to
address the needs of those who are victims of crimes. The commonly held
belief, however valid, that courts are overly concerned with defendants'
rights and not sufficiently concerned with victims' rights impedes children's
281. Materials on file with authors. The District of Columbia and several states have also

attempted a more coercive approach to achieving parental involvement in the child's care by
making the parents subject to the court's jurisdiction, with non-compliance punishable, in some
places, by contempt. See D.C. CODE § 16-2320(c) (silent on contempt power); 42 PA. CONS.
STAT. § 6310 (explicit contempt power).

282. See Reactions and Solutions, in Symposium: The Unnecessary Detention of Children in
the District of Columbia, 3 D.C. L. REV. 425, 435 (1995) (remarks of Joyce Burrell, then Acting
Director of the District Of Columbia's Youth Services Administration, describing resistance to

community-based programs). Atlanta has recently experienced similar resistance. See Special
Photo Editorial, ATLANTA CoNslrrrurioN, June 11, 1995, at B6.

283. For a variety of reasons, juvenile courts across the country have been opened to the
public in recent years. Laurel Shaper Walters, States Try To Rewrite Crime and Punishment,
CRmISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Dec. 5, 1995, at 1. Many legislators have supported this reform to

deprive children of the shield of anonymity. This development provides an opportunity for all
concerned to see whether juvenile courts and agencies are fulfilling their responsibilities.
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advocates in their effort to obtain money, facilities, and public support for
rehabilitative programs. Efforts to address the legitimate concerns of victims
and other fearful, and perhaps skeptical, members of the community without
infringing on the constitutional rights of the accused should be encouraged.
One recently developed juvenile justice model takes as its starting point
the need to engage all community members, and especially victims, in the
response to delinquent behavior. This model, called the Balanced Approach,
consists of three major elements: accountability, competency development,
and community protection. The designers of this model call its core principle
restorative justice, which refers to the imperative of making the victim whole.
The goals of the program go far beyond this, however. The model calls for a
new relationship among the victim, the offender, and the community. It recognizes the offender's responsibility toward the victim and the community,
but also recognizes a reciprocal responsibility on the part of the community
toward the offender. This responsibility obligates the community to provide
the offender with an opportunity to develop competency in important areas.
The model emphasizes providing youths with skills and opportunities related
to basic social interactions, educational advancement, employment training,
and community service. Its proponents argue that by emphasizing competency development in specific concrete settings which are important parts of
the life-course to adulthood, the Balanced Approach renders itself more accountable to the community and the children it serves. If the children do not
demonstrate improved ability in the identified areas, then the programs in
place are not adequate. The Balanced Approach has been implemented in
full or in part in several communities in recent years. 28 4 Like all programs, it
should be judged by its effectiveness in meeting the needs of the community
as a whole as well as the children charged with offenses. If it proves successful by this standard, it should be expanded. 285 Regardless of the fate of this
particular model, however, its proponents' insight concerning the importance
of designing a justice system which attempts to create a more cohesive community should be incorporated into any future model.
Another important contribution of the Balanced Approach is its emphasis on the ongoing relationship between the child and the juvenile justice system. Having received assistance in developing important skills while in the
state's care, the child will be expected to utilize those skills to live a crimefree, productive life. If he does not, despite having been given the opportunity to do so, it is understandable that society would demand a harsher response to a subsequent offense. If, however, the child was never given a
284. Information concerning the Balanced Approach is available upon request from The
Balanced Approach and Restorative Justice Project, Florida Atlantic University, 220 S.E. 2nd
Avenue, Room 616P, Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33301.

285. The influence of this approach is evident from the new purpose clause to Pennsylvania's Juvenile Code, which states as its purpose the provision of programs "which provide
balanced attention to the protection of the community, the imposition of accountability for offenses committed, and the development of competencies to enable children to become responsible and productive members of the community." 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 6301(b).
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meaningful opportunity to utilize his skills, due to circumstances at home or
school or in the community, it is equally understandable that an attorney or
judge would demand further assistance in creating an environment in which
the skills become meaningful. The more specific the discussion is, about just
what should be done and by whom, the more likely some agreement can be
found among the child, family, caseworker, and judge. This focus on responsibilities and relationships is likely to be more fruitful than a search for a
cause or a treatment to cure it. Moreover, this specificity enables the community to assess more readily how the juvenile justice system is performing
and whether the causes for its failures lie within the system or elsewhere. If
children under state supervision make minimal improvements in reading
skills, conflict-resolution, or other behavioral skills, then internal reform
would be a top priority. If, however, children do improve their abilities but
are thwarted by a lack of opportunity, then the community must examine its
own responsibility more closely.
IX. CONCLUSION
In the first century of the juvenile court's existence, providing effective
rehabilitative care to delinquent children has proven to be as difficult as it is
important. Even in good juvenile justice systems, courts struggle with the
limits of their authority and expertise, and agencies struggle to help each
child amid the competing claims of other children for the same resources and
the clamor of the community for protection from these very same children.
In the many dysfunctional juvenile justice systems across this country, these
inherent tensions spill over into chaos that deprives children of opportunities
and keeps communities fearful. There are no magic words to make these
problems go away. Lawyers cannot assert a "right to treatment" and expect
judges to nod, administrators to cower, nightmarish conditions to vanish, and
effective programs to appear. At most, this once-prominent doctrine forbids
only the most horrible abuse or neglect. Other legal arguments discussed in
this article may be more robust in theory, but they cannot result in real
change unless wedded to the power to appropriate funds or redesign systems.
On the other hand, politicians cannot simply call for "punishment" and
thereby make delinquent children, their many and various needs, and the
problems in their communities disappear. Communities can turn their backs
and order more fences, walls, locks, and bars, but the children will still come
home someday. If they come home having been uncared for and feeling unwanted, neither they nor the community will ever benefit from their abilities.
As the centennial of the juvenile court approaches, we can waste our time
looking for answers in constitutions, codes, and courtrooms; or we can instead look closely at our children and ourselves, demand responsibility from
both, apply the lessons of successful and failed programs, and have some reason to hope that tomorrow and the next century will be better.

